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Abstract 
Style investing is a well-documented global phenomenon that refers to the manner in which 
investors formulate their capital allocation decisions. The two broad styles of investing to 
be discussed in this report are the ‘value style’ and the ‘growth style’ investing. Recent 
empirical research suggests that value style of investing outperforms growth style investing 
over the long term. Rational theories suggest that a value premium exist because value 
counters have higher unsystematic risk. However, theories such as behavioural finance 
attribute the value premium to more psychological social factors such as emotional and 
heuristic biases. 
The aim of this study was to determine whether value style investing outperforms growth 
style investing in South Africa. For the purposes of this study, we evaluated the 
performance of various portfolios for the period of December 2000 to December 2015. In 
addition, the study determined the relative risk of the two styles, by testing whether value 
outperforms growth during periods of financial crisis, and during a period of slow economic 
growth. 
In defining the parameters of our study, we divided the constituents of Financial Times and 
London Stock Exchange/Johannesburg Stock Exchange (FTSE /JSE) index into growth 
and value based on their relative Price to book (P/B) going back to December 2000. This 
created four portfolios; namely, Deep value, Relative value, Relative growth and Super 
growth. Portfolio Analytics were employed to determine which style outperforms over the 
period. Regression analyses was used to ascertain which portfolio generated abnormal risk 
adjusted returns over the period. Relative risk is also analysed. 
The results of this research indicate that there is limited evidence of value premium in 
South Africa over the period of the study, albeit there are some periods where one style is 
dominant over the other. Regressions suggest that none of the portfolios constructed using 
market capital weighted generate abnormal returns. However, deep value, relative value 
and relative growth portfolios generate abnormal returns when constructed on equal-
weighted basis. On a relative risk basis, deep value outperforms during the financial crisis, 
whereas relative value outperforms during economic slowdowns. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Investment style refers to managers’ adherence to a predetermined investment 
process, philosophy and asset allocation strategy (Ahmed & Nanda, 2001). 
Investment style is paramount to investors as it assists in differentiating investment 
managers. The two most popular investment syles globally are value and growth 
styles. Fabozzi (1998) defines value style as investing in stocks that have low price 
multiples (low price to earnings, low price to book), whereas the growth style is 
defined as investing in stocks with high past and expected future earnings growth. 
The performance differences between the two styles is well researched globally, 
especially in developed markets; and most studies find that value outperforms 
growth stocks over the long term (Fama & French, 1992; Lakonishok et al., 1994). In 
South Africa (SA), style investing is often dismissed because the market is too small 
Blount (2014).  
Moreover, the value syle approach to investing has come under immense pressure 
recently in SA, on the back of poor perfomance against the benchmark (Friedrick, 
2015). However, Friedrich (2015) believes that the recent underperformance of the 
value style is not a secular trend, but rather a function of a normal value alpha cycle 
that has persisted in the SA market for the past 40 years. In addition, institutional 
investors might prefer growth stocks because they are easy to justify to sponsors 
due to their great past perfomance (Lakonishok et al.,1992b).  
Likewise, career concerns of money managers might also lead to a tilt towards 
growth stocks, as the value strategy usually takes about 3 to 5 years to payoff and 
thus, might underperform the market due to high tracking error against the 
benchmark, which in turn implies reporting negative excess returns for prolonged 
periods, putting the money manager at risk of being fired (Lakonishok et al.,1992b). 
Portfolio managers may, therefore, suffer from behavioural biases that may influence 
their decision making process, which sometimes deviates from logic and reasoning 
(Baker & Ricciardi, 2014). This includes a familiarity bias (Baker & Ricciardi, 2014), 
which influences their asset allocation or stock selection despite following a 
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predetermined investment process, hence it is prudent to construct portfolios using 
strict rules to mitigate for such bias. 
This research thesis provides a detailed analysis on: (1) how value stocks which are 
constructed without portfolio manager judgment overlay, perform in SA; and (2) how 
value stock performance is affected by different financial and economic conditions. 
1.1 Background and Context 
Investment style is a common principle used to analyse, classify and select equity 
portfolios. Multi manager firms or investment research firms classify equity funds for 
their clients for consideration for investment based on investment style. Institutional 
investors, consultants, financial advisors, and individuals use investment style as a 
criterion for selecting funds, either to achieve diversification or to make style bets 
(Kaplan 2003).   
Definitions of investment style varies; however, the most common investing styles are 
growth and value investing styles. Most investors use P/B (price to book) and P/E 
(price to earnings) to label stocks as either value or growth. Value stocks are those 
perceived to be cheap on valuation metrics, i.e., low P/B and low P/E, relative to their 
history and industry. The risk to such a strategy is that the stock price never 
improves, which is known as a “value trap”.  
Conversely, growth or glamour stocks are companies with high growth rate in 
earnings or sales, high P/E and high P/B, and pay very low or no dividends relative to 
history and industry. These stocks are priced for perfection and the risk to such a 
strategy is when future growth falls short of expectations, their stock price may 
plunge.    
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Figure 1-1: MSCI value versus Growth 
 
Figure 1-1 above indicates the inherent cyclical nature of value and growth styles from 
MSCI South African Indices, and it shows that currently we in the longest growth cycle in 
the South Africa market since 1997. The graph also indicates the price to earnings multiple 
of the market at every peak and trough, which as expected, surge when growth 
outperforms and pull back when value outperforms. Against this background, it was critical 
to investigate how value stocks perform and thus, attempt to understand these 
performance characteristics in different economic and financial market conditions. 
1.2  Problem statement 
We have established that style investing drives a lot of capital allocation decisions 
with institutional investors likely to prefer growth tilt as they can easily market such 
investments to sponsors. However, various studies suggest that the value investing 
approach may be superior to growth. Nevertheless in SA, value style investing has 
been out of favor for a long time. Therefore, this research helps to clarify this puzzle 
and assist capital allocators in SA to understand how value style, without portfolio 
manager overlay, performs in different economic and financial market conditions. 
The Brandes Institute (2012) conducted research on value versus growth globally, 
focusing on the USA market and non USA market, including emerging market using 
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Lakonishok et al.’s (1994)1 methodology. This methodology was used for developed 
markets and the outcome was that value outperforms growth over the term.  
Auret and Sinclaire (2006) investigated the price to book ratio, and results on the 
FTSE/JSE market and found that book to market/price has stronger significance than 
size and price to earnings ratio on the JSE.  
According to Maginn et al. (2007), growth stocks typically do better during an 
economic contraction than expansion, on the back of the fact that there are few firms 
with growth prospects during the economic contractions, so growth stocks often see 
their valuation increase, whereas during an expansion phase, the valuation premium 
for growth stock is much smaller. Hence it is prudent to investigate how do value 
stocks perform during expansionary and contracting environments.  
The primary aim of the study was to determine whether the mean excess returns of 
value style investing significantly exceed the mean excess returns of growth investing 
in SA, furthermore, to ascertain whether this outperformance is conditional on 
economic or financial market conditions. 
1.3 Research objective and hypothesis 
The main aim was to ascertain whether value investing has achieved superior returns 
in South Africa compared to growth investing. This was achieved by dividing the 
constituents of Financial Times and London Stock Exchange/Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (FTSE /JSE) index into growth and value based on their relative P/B going 
back to December 2000. This helped in creating four portfolios namely Deep value, 
Relative value, Relative growth and Super growth. We then compared the respective 
portfolios risk adjusted returns relative to: (1) the other portfolios and (2) the overall 
market.  
This also assisted in establishing whether evidence drawn from international 
evidence is applicable in South Africa given the challenges of South African market 
which includes but not limited to the smaller breadth and size of the market. We also 
investigated the characteristics of value stocks in different markets and economic 
                                               
1
 Lakonishok et al. (1994), stocks were divided based on fundamentals (price to book, price to cash flow, 
price to earnings), where the aggregate of performance of each decile was tracked over time. The 
categorisation of stocks was repeated each year. 
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environments. This benefits all the capital allocations in South Africa, particularly 
institutional investors, consultants, financial advisors and retail investors. 
1.3.1 Hypothesis I 
H0: The mean excess return of value portfolios is equal to the mean excess return 
of growth portfolios. 
This means that value stocks do not outperforms growth stocks over the long term in 
South Africa. The common belief is that value counters outperform growth counters on 
risk adjusted basis (Fama & French 2006). 
1.3.2 Hypothesis II 
H0: The average performance of value portfolio is equal to the average performance 
of growth portfolio during a period of economic slowdown. 
This means that value stocks do not outperform growth stocks during a period of 
economic contraction. The general belief is that value counters outperform growth 
counters in an economic expansion period,  (Maginn et al. 2007) 
1.3.3 Hypothesis III 
HO: The average performance of value portfolio is equal to the average performance 
of growth portfolio during a period when overall market is negative, also known as bear 
market. 
This means that value counters do not outperform growth counters during financial 
crisis or bear market. According to Lukonishok et al. (1994), this helps measure the 
relative riskiness of value versus growth styles, which helps verify the high 
fundamental risk claimed by Fama and French (1992). 
1.4 Planned structure  
The research report covers the following chapters: 
 Literature review 
16 
 
This section covers theory behind style investing globally and locally in order to 
understand the theory behind style investing, particularly within the FTSE/JSE 
context. 
 Data and Methodology 
This chapter provides details on how the data was collected and processed given the 
research objectives and hypothesis including the research methodology. Additionally, 
this chapter covers how the portfolios were created. 
 Findings 
This chapter covers the outcome of the analysis of the data and is presented in an 
understandable and user friendly way. 
 Conclusion 
In this chapter the researcher shares his opinion on value investing performance 
compared to growth investing, including relevant performance under different market 
and economic environments. 
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2 Literature Review 
 
2.1  Introduction 
Many studies have been undertaken to examine value and growth style investing, with 
Fama and French (1992) and Lakonishok et al. (1994) arguing that value strategies 
outperforms growth strategies and the market. In the South African context, 
Robertson and Van Rensburg (2003) found that value strategies exhibit a positive 
relationship with equity returns within all industries, however, the value effect is much 
more pronounced in the financial and industrial sectors than in the resource sector. 
The studies above challenge the two most famous theories of modern finance theory 
namely, Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). 
The CAPM attempts to explain the risk - return relationship, where it describes the 
expected or required returns of a security by implying the expected return on a 
security is a linear  function of  its market beta (sensitivity of security compared to 
market). By implication, the market beta of the security is sufficient in explaining the 
expected return.  
However, Fama and French (1992) argue that size (market equity), defined as market 
capitalisation of security, adds to the explanation of the cross section of average 
returns, with small caps average returns higher compared to large caps given that 
small caps have higher beta estimates.  
Fama and French (1992) also argue that leverage, earnings to price (earnings relative 
to stock price) and book to market or price (book value relative to market value or 
price) are important in explaining expected returns; moreover, at times the 
combination of size (market equity) and book to market (price) are much more 
significant in explaining expected returns. As such, they also negate the roles of 
leverage and earning to price during the 1963 to 1990 sample period. 
Additionally, their research results show that price to book has much more 
explanatory power on expected returns than size (market equity). Chan et al. (1991) 
studied the effects of four variables, namely size (market equity), book to market 
(price) ratio, earnings yield (earnings over price), and cash flow yield (cash flow over 
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price) in the Japanese market. The outcome was that book to market (price) and cash 
flow yield were most significant in explaining expected returns over the period from 
1971 to 1988.  
The purpose of this section is to introduce, outline and define investment style 
investing and theories in finance, highlighting global and local empirical studies and 
implication thereof. The next part of this section is organised as follows: In section 2.2 
we describe and characterise value styles. In section 2.3 we discuss the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis (EMH) in relation to style investing. In section 2.4 we discuss 
behavioural finance and effects, including psychology, in the financial market. In 
section 2.5 we discuss CAPM. Here we inspect and clarify the key points of this 
model.  
In section 2.6 we discuss the size (market equity) effects. In section 2.7 we 
understand the Lakonishok et al. (1994) methodology. In Section 2.8 we examine the 
value versus growth phenomenon, looking at empirical evidence that support each 
investment style global and in SA, with section 2.9 discussing the relative riskiness of 
value and growth strategy. Section 2.10 concludes the literature review.  
2.2 Defining style investing 
There exist three main groupings of investment styles: Value, growth and market-
oriented. Lakonishok et al. (1994) defined value stock as counter that has 
underperformed at a previous time period and is expected to continue with this 
underperformance in the future. Typically a value investor desires counters that are 
trading at low financial ratio multiples, such as low price to book multiple and low price 
to earnings multiple, with a belief that although currently the firm’s earnings are 
depressed, they expect them to rise in the future, in what they term reversion back to 
mean. 
Fabozzi (1998) also define three other important styles within value investing; (1) 
Contrarian style, which entail looking for companies sell than book value i.e. stocks 
that are temporarily depressed; (2) high dividend yield, which favours stocks paying 
high dividends, (3) depressed price multiples, which favours stocks that are trading at 
low multiples compared to their history, with a hope that once the company recovers; 
the share will also recover. 
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Lakonishok et al. (1994) defined growth or attraction stocks as those that had stellar 
historic performance and are expected to continue performing well in the future. 
Growth investors typically focus on earnings, where they look for companies that have 
a high probability of increasing their earnings in the future, which in turn, should drive 
the share price performance higher. The danger for growth investors is when the 
growth in earnings surprises to the downside, causing the price to earnings multiple to 
fall, and as a result, the stock price plunges.  
Maginn et al. (2007) define two important styles within growth investing, namely: (1) 
steady earnings growth, which focuses on companies that have delivered strong 
earnings growth historically and are anticipated to persist in the future: (2) Momentum, 
which focuses on companies that have historically experienced an increase in their 
share price and are expected to continue to outperform going forward. 
Maginn et al. (2007) defines the term market-oriented investing, which is sometimes 
referred to as core investing, as investing that is neither value nor growth. These 
portfolios usually resemble a broad market average over time. According to Maginn et 
al. (2007), the sub styles to market oriented investing are market oriented with a bias 
to, growth at reasonable price (GARP), market oriented with value tilt and style 
rotation. Value and growth tilting means the portfolio is much more diversified, and 
that it is not full-blown value or growth. GARP investors seek stocks with growth 
prospect that sell at moderate valuation, they do not want to overpay for earnings 
growth. Style rotators adopt a style that they view will be popular going forward. 
2.3 Efficient Market Hypothesis 
Fama (1970) defined a market where prices always “fully reflect” available information 
as efficient. However, the nature of the information is important in determining the 
level of efficiency in the market. As such, the market is said to be weak form efficient 
when the information in question reflects only historical prices, semi strong efficient 
when prices reflects all public information (announcement of earnings, stock splits, 
etc.) and strong form efficient when prices show or include all types of information, 
including insider trading. 
The implication of the above is that neither technical analysis (which looks at historical 
prices to try to infer expected prices) nor fundamental analysis (which analyses 
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financial information in attempts to determine undervalued or cheap companies relative 
to their intrinsic value) would enable investors to generate abnormal returns, including a 
case where investors use insider information. Insider trading is illegal and makes this 
form of efficiency debatable. One of the most common belief in investments is that 
higher unsystematic risk is associated with higher expected or required return (Jain & 
Khan 2006); that said, holding all other factors constant, investors expect a higher risk 
adjusted return in an inefficient market. 
Efficient market hypothesis is also known as ”random walk theory”, which entails that 
security price changes (successive one or multi period returns) are independent of 
each other. Allen et al. (2006) suggests that stock returns in one week do not affects 
stock returns the following week, post the criticism that one day was too short to spot 
a pattern.  
Fama (1970) suggests that market conditions consistent with efficiency manifest in a 
market where:  
 There are no transaction expenses when buying or selling stocks,  
 Information is free and readily available to all participants in the market, and  
 All investors interpret present information about future prices similarly.  
Malkiel (2011) believes that EMH does not mean that prices are always accurate; 
rather it implies that no one knows whether prices are too high or too low. Additionally, 
EMH does not mean that bubbles are impossible and that factors such as behavioural 
finance and environmental issues do affect the required rate of return of a security.  
Malkiel (2003) labels efficiency as markets that make it impossible for investors to 
achieve returns that are above average compared to the market without taking above 
average risks. He argues that market are not perfect but are efficient even during the 
time where there is a valuation mistake e.g. the Internet bubble late 1999-early 2000; 
additionally, markets are efficient even when agents that participate in the market are 
not rational and also efficient even when stock prices display higher volatility 
compared to what fundamentals can justify. This is because he views markets as a 
great device for reflecting new information quickly and accurately. 
That said, if markets are efficient then no investment style should generate above 
average returns or abnormal returns compared to the market, without taking above 
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average risk. In order words, the price of share reflects fair value of share, which is 
equivalent to discounting the company future cash flow by the correct cost of capital.   
However, Capaul et al. (1993) studied returns of value (low P/B) versus growth (high 
P/B) portfolios in six countries namely United Kingdom, Switzerland, United States, 
German, France, and Japan. Their results suggest that on average during the period 
studied (1981 to 1992), value outperforms growth stocks. Additionally, the cross 
country correlations on month-to-month value-growth spread were not big, signifying 
that a call to tilt the portfolio to value stocks would have been effective worldwide. 
Lukonishok et al. (1994) on their paper on contrarian investments, extrapolation and 
risks, argue that value outperforms growth stocks in the US due to the behaviour of 
investors i.e. investors sometimes over-react or under-react to certain information, 
additionally value investors are contrarian and do not follow the herd, hence value 
stocks generate superior returns compared to growth stocks. 
However, Fama (1998) argues that the long run above average returns anomaly due 
to the psychological behaviour by market participants are time and methodology 
dependent, with a minor change in time interval and methodology yielding a different 
result. He argues that this should not happen if markets were inefficient.  
Fama and French (1992) also reached the same conclusion, however they attributed 
the outperformance by value stocks to higher risk by the strategy. Fama (1998) 
argued that the over-reaction and under-reaction by market participants to 
information, should cancel each other as the frequency of each reaction should be the 
same over the long term, hence impossible to achieve above normal returns over the 
long term. 
However, this is may not be true in emerging market such China; Liu (2003) examined 
weak form efficiency in the Chinese market (Shanghai Stock Exchange) for the period 
of April 1996 to April 2002 and rejected the theory on the back of contrarian 
strategies, also known as value strategies, that generated excess returns over the 
period. Chung (2006) also investigated weak form efficiency in Shenzhen and 
Shanghai, for the period of February 1992 to December 2006. He considered daily 
returns with an aim of also testing for the “day of the week effect”. What came out of 
this was that both Chinese markets were not weak form efficient. 
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Bo and Krige (2008) investigated value counters versus growth counters in the Hang 
Seng stock market. They found that value counters outperform growth counters on the 
Hang Seng market for the period from 1981 to 2005, which holds for periods pre and 
post the Asian crisis in 1997. This anomaly was found to be greater for equally 
weighted portfolios and still persisted after controlling for size effect. This challenges 
the legitimacy of the efficient market hypothesis in emerging markets. 
Hoque et al. (2007) investigated weak form efficiency in eight Asian markets (namely, 
Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, and 
Thailand) for the periods between 1990 and 2004, splitting the data to pre and post 
Asian crisis in 1997. They found that stock prices do not conform to the “random walk” 
theory, leading to rejecting EMH in all countries except Korea and Taiwan. 
Basiewicz and Auret (2010) investigated Fama and French (1993)’s three factor 
model to explain value and size premium for the period from December 1989 to July 
2005 in SA. In a time series test on grouped data, they found time-series variation in 
most assets, whereas in data that was not grouped, the three factor models explains 
the value and size effect on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). 
Graham and Uliana (2001) investigated the support of growth and value observable 
fact on industrial companies listed on the JSE for the period between 1987 through to 
1996. They found that in the period 1987-1992, industrial growth stocks outperform 
industrial value stocks; however value stocks outperformed for the period after 1992. 
The EMH has been challenged globally and in SA, with the majority of empirical 
evidence supporting the notion that value counters outperform counters over the long 
term, and thus achieve abnormal returns compared to the overall market when returns 
are adjusted for risk. 
Shiller (2013) deems the EMH a half-truth and argues that if the theory said that it is 
not likely that the typical non-professional investor will generate excess profit by 
trading in the market on the strength of public information, then the premise will be 
spot on, due to his high level scepticism on investment tips. Woolley (2014) argues 
that EHM has failed to explain market behaviour and asset pricing of recent years on 
the back of theory failing to fully address the principal agent problem and asymmetry 
of information. 
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That said, the jury is still out on the reasons behind such as anomaly, hence it is 
prudent to investigate the theory that attempt to explain the return-risk relationship of 
securities, the CAPM, in order to assess whether investors who achieve excess return 
do so with or without taking additional risks. 
The section below address the arguments on risk return within the context of CAPM. 
2.4 Capital asset pricing model (CAPM) 
The independent work by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Black (1972), stemming 
from the early work of mean variance portfolio theory by Markowitz (1959), coined the 
term CAPM, which has played a crucial role in quantifying the required or expected 
rate of return for an investor. CAPM links the expected return of the security with the 
securities’ measure of risk. Thus the expected return is a function of two prices: (1) 
price of time (risk free rate); and (2) price of risk (market risk premium,) 
The CAPM is identified by the equation below: 
Equation 2-1: The CAPM equation  
                 
Where; 
  = the required or expected return of a portfolio or security; 
  = the securities (portfolio) measure of risk (non-diversifiable or systematic risk); 
    = anticipated return of a risk free asset; and 
   = anticipated return on the market portfolio 
The three main assumptions of the model are markets are in equilibrium (frictionless 
market, unlimited risk-free borrowing and lending), mean variance investors (to create 
optimal portfolios, investors only need to know expected returns, variance and 
covariance) and homogenous belief about mean variance, which entail investors have 
the same forecasts on expected returns, variance and covariance. The implication of 
CAPM model is that beta (systematic risk) is sufficient in explaining the cross section 
of expected return on asset.  
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However, Banz (1981), in his examination of the connection between total market 
value of ordinary stock and returns, argues that “size effect” (small caps stocks in New 
York Stock exchange (NYSE)) typically achieved higher risk adjusted returns than 
large caps stock, in the 1936-1975 period. 
Fama and French (1992) also argue that size (market equity) and book to market 
capitalisation offer an important explanation of the cross section of average returns for 
the period 1963-1990.  
Bhandari (1998) also found beta to be inadequate in explaining the expected returns 
of a common stock and argued that leverage also is important in explaining expected 
returns. He offers that a rise in leverage of a company also causes the risk to common 
equity to rise, although not cross sectional, the common stock equity of higher 
leverage firm has higher risk compared to common stock with lower leverage, since 
firms have varying levels of leverage, hence it is expected that leverage has a positive 
correlation with common stock equity. 
Another implication of CAPM is that investors can all identify the same “market 
portfolio” given that they have the same expectations and use mean variance analysis 
and thus combine a risky portfolio with risk free asset when creating their desired 
portfolio.  
Fama and French (2006) investigated whether the CAPM explains the value premium 
and whether regular returns are explained by market beta, as suggested by CAPM, 
for the period 1923 to 2004. Noteworthy, 1963 is the start date for Fama and French 
(1992, 1993)’s work, so the period 1926 to 1963 is out of sample relative to earlier 
studies. They found average value premium in the US is similar pre and post 1963. 
However, they also found that the market betas change significantly, with value stocks 
market beta coming out lower than growth stocks, which is opposite of what CAPM 
suggests, hence is unsuccessful at explaining the value premium for the period 1963 
to 2004. For the period 1926 to 1963, the CAPM explains the value premium perfectly. 
Additionally, they concluded CAPM fails to explain portfolio pricing formed on size 
(Market equity), book to market (price) and market beta (systematic risk) for 1928 to 
2004, and find that it is size (market equity) and book to market (price) or risk linked to 
them that explains average returns, not the market beta. 
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Basu and Chalwa (2010) investigated CAPM in Indian stock market for the period 
January 2003 to February 2008. They examined 10 portfolios with 50 stocks each and 
the outcome was that CAPM fails completely within the Indian context for the period of 
the study.  
They found the intercept term to be significantly different to zero and was very large in 
all portfolios. Additionally, there was a negative association between market beta and 
excess return, which is contrary to CAPM theory, indicating an inefficient capital 
market. They also found significant unsystematic risk through significant residual 
variance, with the regression also showing poor explanatory power. 
Xhu and Zhou (2001) also investigated the CAPM on the Shanghai stock exchange 
for the period 1995 to 2001; they found that beta failed to explain the average returns 
of the securities for three periods, namely, June 1995 to June 1998, June 1996 to 
June 1999 and June 1997 to June 2000. However, CAPM holds true for period from 
June 1996 to June 2001, citing investors becoming more rational as the main reason.  
Ning and Liu (2004) also updated this research, focusing on cross sectional and time-
series regressions, testing the Capital Asset Pricing Model in the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange for the period from 1996 to 2002. They established that CAPM failed during 
this period, with the relationship between beta and expected return being nonlinear 
and with significant residual errors, which implies nonsystematic risk has an effect on 
expected return. 
Van Rensburg (2001) investigated a presence of style based effect using JSE 
industrials for the period 1983 to 1999 and found eleven effects existed on risk 
adjusted basis, namely value (dividend yield, earnings yield, price to net asset value 
(NAV) and historic five year earnings growth), quality (sales or revenue, leverage, 
cash flow to debt and size (market equity) and momentum (historic three, six and 
twelve months prices). Robertson and Van Rensburg (2003b) also found that stocks 
with low price to earnings (value stocks) outperformed those with high price to 
earnings (growth stocks); additionally value stocks had lower sensitivity to the market 
compared to growth shares, which contradicts the CAPM model. 
Auret and Sinclaire (2006) also established that on the JSE, book to market (price) is 
more superior in explaining expected returns than size and price to earnings as per 
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Robersons and Van Rensburg (2003). He argues that price to book (price) subsumes 
the significance of both size (market equity) and price to earnings in the three-variable 
regression, however the inclusion of price to book fails to improve Van Rensburg and 
Roberson model due to high correlation with the two attributes, which have high 
explanatory power. This also challenges CAPM model. 
2.5 Behavioural Finance  
Shiller (2003) labels behavioural finance as “finance from a broader social science 
perspective including psychology and sociology”. This entails that its focus on how 
investors behave and make decisions. This theory contradicts the efficient market 
hypothesis despite drawing some of its concepts from traditional finance.  
He notes, from understanding behavioural finance and applying the right standard, 
that there is no expectation of making a quick and reliable profit off market 
inefficiency. However the market can be wrong in some other senses such as major 
stock market bubbles, which present opportunities for making profits. 
Bryne and Brooks (2008) contrast the main difference between traditional finance and 
behaviour finance. They define traditional finance as a model where individuals are 
assumed to be rational and risk averse, which entail they have perfect information and 
they process the information accurately and instantly, without biases, with the main 
focus on maximising their personal utility function.  
Nevertheless, they note that this framework fails to address some of the essential 
facts concerning the market including cross section of average returns and personal 
trading behaviour. Then again, they argue that behavioural finance is founded on the 
notion that individuals, or at least a minority of them, are less rational and subject to 
behavioural predispositions in processing information and decision making. This can 
results in markets that deviate from market efficiency, temporally or persistently.  
They argue that framing or how information is shown can influence decision making, 
leading to both cognitive and emotional biases. Cognitive errors or biases are due to 
the investor’s faulty reasoning or lack of understanding or incorrect information 
processing e.g. investors may suffer from overconfidence, where they overrate their 
capacity and precision with which they process information resulting in making a 
suboptimal decision, which is not rational.  
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On the other hand, emotional errors are not related to conscious thoughts; they 
originate from impulse or intuition and feelings. These biases could lead to individuals 
processing information quicker or slower than others, which could lead to the market 
deviating from efficiency, at least temporaly.  
  Fama (1998) investigated market efficiency, long term returns and behavioural 
finance partly in response to Lakanoshok et al.’s (1994) justification of why value 
stocks outperform growth stocks, which Lakanoshok et al. (1994) cited as one of the 
reasons being that investors overreact or under-react to information presented.  
Fama (1998) argues that abnormal returns on how the market reacts to information, 
which is consistent with market efficiency, are chance results, with the frequency of 
overreaction as common as under-reaction, hence cancelling out. Additionally, the 
abnormal returns are sensitive to the methodology and time period used in the study. 
Shiller (2003) responded to the findings in Fama’s (1998) literature review on 
behavioural finance. Shiller (2003) argues that the assertion made by Fama (1998) 
regarding the anomaly that there seem to be as much underreacting by investors to 
information as over reactors as incorrect, since this assertion is not backed by any 
fundamental psychological principle. Additionally, the second criticism regarding an 
anomaly which disappears due to change in methodology or time interval is also 
weak as the model has been tested in multiple geographies. 
Barberis and Thaler (2003) argues that efficient market hypothesis proponents 
based on arbitragers, force the market back to efficiency, as a result of some 
investors being irrational, are incorrect due to limits to arbitrage, which can permit 
substantial mispricing. They also note that prices can be wrong without creating 
profit opportunity, as mispriced assets can lack a fairly close substitute, which 
exposes the arbitrageurs from effectively hedging their position in the case of 
unfavourable changes in fundamentals. They also argue that, from the traditional 
finance framework point of view, it is difficult to understand the fundamental facts 
about total stock market, the cross section of average and individual stock 
behaviour. 
Bryne and Brooks (2008) also explain two theories falling under behavioural finance, 
namely behavioural asset pricing and behavioural portfolio theory.  
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Behavioural portfolio theory (BPT) is based on empirical evidence and the 
observation that individuals construct a portfolio by layers, where each layer 
represent a different expected risk and return. Allocation of funds on each layer 
depends on the importance of each goal to investors. If an investor believes they 
hold an information advantage, then a highly concentrated portfolio is possible, 
which is in contrast to traditional finance and efficient market hypothesis.  
Additionally, if an investor suffering from loss aversion (investors who strongly prefer 
to avoid losses to acquiring gain, where the pain felt on loss is more painful than the 
equivalent satisfaction on the gain), would hold larger positions in cash to mitigate 
the risk of selling assets at low prices in case liquidity is required.  
One of the most common cognitive errors that investors make is to confuse a good 
company with a good investment, due to the fact that most of the good news about 
such a company is already factored in the price. Anderson and Smith (2006) 
investigated this mistake by looking at companies identified as great companies by 
Fortune magazine in the United States for the period 1983 through to 2004. They 
found that the portfolio of these shares provided better returns than the market by a 
considerable margin, which is also against the efficient market hypothesis. 
According to Bryne and Brooks (2008), the behavioural asset pricing model which is 
drawn from capital asset pricing models, adds a sentiment premium to the discount 
rate, which entails that the required or expected return on an asset is the risk-free 
rate, plus a fundamental risk premium, plus a sentiment premium. The sentiment 
premium can be estimated by considering the dispersion of analysts' forecasts. A 
high dispersion suggests a higher sentiment premium. This is also in contradiction to 
CAPM as it argues that market beta sufficiently covers all risk in the security. 
Barker and Wurgler (2006) investigated investor sentiment and cross section of 
expected returns in the US for the period 1963 to 2001; they argue that sentiment 
affects security valuation and subsequent returns. When sentiment at the beginning 
of the period is low, subsequent returns are higher on small and young (new listed) 
versus old companies, highly volatile compared to low volatile stocks, non-payers 
versus dividend payers, unprofitable versus profitable ones. The reverse is true for 
these stocks when the beginning of period sentiment is high. 
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Oprean and Tanasescu (2014) investigated the effects on behavioural finance in 
emerging markets, namely Brazil and Romania for the period June 2009 to June 2013. 
Their aim was to analyse investor behaviour on trading volume for investors based on 
rational theories versus an investor that follows behavioural finance. They used daily 
index levels or values on both market and daily volumes and found that trading is 
influenced by the behavioural finance (irrational behaviour), thus rejecting traditional 
finance in both markets. 
This behaviour influences the money manager’s portfolio construction decision 
making, which sometimes lead to not being true to the desired style by omitting 
stocks based on heuristics, which also affects the portfolio composition and the 
subsequent portfolio style returns. 
2.6 Size Effect 
One of the anomalies that challenges the CAPM model is the tendency of companies 
with small capitalisation to outperform companies with large capitalisation over the 
long term. Fama and French (1993) did a study in the United States using data from 
1963 to 1999, where they created ten portfolios based on their size. Stocks were 
divided into deciles with decile one representing smallest 10% of all stocks and decile 
ten representing largest stocks. 
Figure 2-1: The size effect 
 
The results show that stocks with small market capitalisation in the United States 
represented by decile one outperform stocks with large market capitalisation 
represented by decile ten. Fama and French (1993) state that the relationship 
between market betas (systematic risk) was flat and not upward sloping as CAPM 
suggest. Additionally, they created ten portfolios based on their beta and size which 
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yielded similar results as figure 2-1.They argue that size may be a better measure for 
risks compared to beta, and that their results should not be viewed as anomaly. 
Milkier (2003) argued that the size anomaly is still questionable given that from mid 
1980s through to mid-1990s, stocks with large market capitalisation in most of the 
world’s markets outperformed stocks with smaller market capitalisation. He argues 
that one of the reasons was the growing institutionalisation of the market led portfolio 
managers who prefers larger companies on the back of liquidity requirements, with 
stocks with small capitalisation posing a challenge to liquidate significant blocks of 
stocks. He also note that survivorship bias also poses a risk to the studies of “size 
effect” as most data of small companies who have failed are not captured on the 
returns, thus skewing the results to those who survived, hence the great performance 
from small stocks. 
Damodaran (2012) also examined performance of small capitalisation stocks in the 
US, from 1927 to 2010.The outcome reaffirmed the existence of the small 
capitalisation premium, with small stock portfolios (value weighted) generating 20% 
return over the period compared to 11% return by large stock portfolios. Additionally, 
portfolios that were equally weighted increases the premium, which entails that the 
premium is earned by the smallest companies. He argues that success of this strategy 
is not guaranteed every period and that timing is important. He also notes that the 
small capitalisation premium is greatest in micro-capitalisation stocks (market cap less 
than $250 million or lower), citing that these companies are low priced and illiquid and 
not followed by equity research analysts. 
Damodaran (2012) also argues, through other studies, that “size effect” exists in 
other markets outside the United States to the tune of 7%, 8.8% and 5.1% in the 
United Kingdom, France and Japan respectively. However, Germany has a much 
smaller size effect. One of the explanations of small cap premium is transaction cost, 
with bid-ask spread tending to be higher for small companies, additionally they also 
have a high price impact due to the fact that they are less liquid. Governance risk can 
also explain the premium as these stocks are not followed by the investment analyst 
community; hence the lack of scrutiny poses additional risk to small stocks.  
Cakici et al. (2012) examined the presence of momentum, size (market equity), and 
value in 18 emerging markets across Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America for the 
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period January 1990 to December 2011, where size and value definition were 
consistent with Fama and French’s (1992) definition. They defined momentum as 
portfolios of winners minus losers on a rolling twelve months period. The countries 
were split according to the Morgan Stanley Capital Index, namely: (1) Eastern Europe 
(Russia, Czech Republic, Turkey, Poland and Hungary); (2) Asia (India, Taiwan, 
Indonesia, Philippines, South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and China); and (3) Latin 
America (Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Brazil and Argentina). 
They found that both momentum and value effects are significant in all countries, 
except for Eastern Europe. The value effect was strong in both small and large caps, 
which contradict findings in developed markets; however, the momentum effects were 
larger for small capitalisation stocks compared to large capitalisation stocks, which is 
consistent with the developed market. Additionally, they also found that value and 
momentum effects are negatively correlated, which entail that they diversify each 
other well. 
The size effect seem to be present in both developed and emerging markets, with 
small stocks believed to generate abnormal returns over the long term. As such, this 
provides high explanatory power to average returns in the stock market across the 
globe. Drawing from the literature above, size (market equity) and value factors from 
the Fama and French model seems have high explanatory power in variation of 
returns, thus it is prudent to revisit the value versus growth debate across the globe. 
2.7 Understanding Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) used two methods to define value or growth companies. The 
first method used was a simple one-variable method where financial ratios are used 
as a basis for the style strategies. The four financial ratios are: 
 Price to earnings 
 Price to book; 
 Price to Cash flow; and 
 Growth in sales (Five year average growth in sales) 
The sample covered in the study is from April 1963 to April 1990, covering stocks 
listed in New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange 
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(AMEX).They only considered the largest 50% of the stocks ranked by full market 
capitalisation, which reflects the investable universe of institutional investors.  
The remaining stocks were ranked according to the above mentioned financial ratios 
on a five year buy and hold view, which entail that the first portfolio was formed in 
1968, rebalanced every year until 1989. Ten deciles were formed, where the highest 
decile represented stocks with the highest ratios relative to the four financial ratios 
(independently), which represents value stocks. Decile one, which represents growth 
stocks have low ratios relative to the four financial ratios quoted above. Upon 
completion of the portfolio creation process, they counted 22 sets of each financial 
ratio mentioned above. 
The second method used by Lakonishok et al. (1994) employed a variety of two 
variable methods to categorise companies into value and growth portfolios. The 
combination of variables for their two variable methods is as follows: 
 Growth in sales and price-to-book; 
 Growth in sales and price-to-cash flow; and 
 Growth in sales and price-to-earnings. 
They independently formed three groups for each variable, where the first group 
contained 30% of the companies with the lowest five year average annual sales 
growth percentage. The second group contained the companies whose sales growth 
falls into the middle 40% and the third group contained the final 30% of companies 
whose sales growth is the highest.  
A similar method was applied to the three financial ratios independently such that 
there are two sets of companies that are divided into three groups. As a result, the 
companies that have slow five year annual sales growth rates and lowest price 
multiples formed a value portfolio, whereas the companies with highest five year 
annual sales growth and high price multiples formed the growth portfolio. 
2.8 Hypothesis I (Value versus Growth stocks) 
The Brandes Institute (2012) conducted research on value versus growth globally, 
focusing on the USA market and non USA market including the emerging market. The 
main objective was to quantify the value premium and gauge its prevalence not to 
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resolve the prevalence or persistence of the premium, which is often a subject of 
debate.  
They employed Lakonishok et al. (1994) on variable methodology, examining returns 
for US stocks from 1968 to 2012 and 1980 to 2012 for non US markets. They found 
that value outperforms growth globally from 1980 to 2012; however the magnitude of 
the premium has dropped from 2007, reflecting a difficult environment for value stocks 
from 2008 to 2012. 
In the US, the long term value stocks represented by low price to book decile, 
returned 12.8% on a five year annualised return, compared to growth stocks return of 
4.3%, an outperformance or premium of 8.5% for the period 1968 to 2012. 
However, shorter term performance indicates that in the US, value counters have 
underperformed growth counters, weighing in on the recent underperformance of 
value stocks. Thus the average return over the last two rolling five year return periods 
for value is -6.9% compared to growth returns of 2.3% for the same period, indicating 
value underperformance.  
However, non USA returns including emerging market returns over the recent years 
are still in favour of value stocks lifted by small caps recently. For emerging markets, 
they used Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) emerging market definitions, 
which covers about 23 countries in the emerging market countries.  
Using the Lakonishok et al. (1994) methodology, for the period 1980 to 2012, they 
found value stocks, represented by low price to book, annualised five year return was 
20.3% compared to growth stocks return of only 4.6%; an outperformance or premium 
of 15.7%. Additionally, they also monitored the year on year persistence of the 
premium in order to account for the inherent high volatility in the emerging markets 
and they found the value premium to be highly persistent on a yearly basis.  
Capaul et al. (1993) also investigated the existence of the value versus growth factor, 
from 1981 to 1992 in six major markets, namely, France, German, US, Japan, United 
Kingdom and Switzerland. They analysed returns from portfolios with low price to 
book ratio, defined as value portfolios and those with high price to book, defined as 
growth in the six major markets.  
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They found that growth and value factors exist in all countries except for one, with 
significant dispersion or variation in performance of value stocks and growth stocks on 
a month on month basis. It follows that value counters outperformed growth counters 
in each country on average over the studied period. 
One of the criticisms of their study was the use of one classification of value stocks by 
one measure, which is price to book, which they justified as current security price 
represents the investor’s outlook of future prospects and book to value represents the 
accountant’s representation of its past costs, where the greater the company’s 
prospects for future growth implies that the ratio of its future prospects to its 
embedded cost should be higher.  
Fama and French (1998) also investigated value versus growth in thirteen developed 
major markets from 1975 through to 1995. They found by sorting on price to book, 
value style outperformed growth style in all countries except for one. The difference in 
returns of portfolios with low price to book was 7.68% per year. They also found a 
similar premium using price to earnings, price to cash flow and dividend yield. The 
evidence of existence of the value premium was also found in emerging markets. 
Graham and Juliana (2001) investigated growth and value in industrial companies 
listed on the JSE for the period between 1987 through to 1996. They found that in the 
period 1987-1992, industrial growth stocks outperformed industrial value stocks; 
however value stocks outperformed for the period after 1992. They also admit that the 
result could be affected by political and economic factors; including South Africa 
returning to the financial arena after a period of sanctions and a decrease in the 
inflation rate over the period. 
Mutton and Muller (2007) investigated the benefit of equity style timing in the JSE for 
the period of 1986 to 2006 in the JSE Industrial sector. They found that value style 
reigns supreme over growth style in the long term, regardless of size effect, however 
there are periods where growth portfolios also outperform. They argue that there is a 
benefit in timing the style turning points rather than buying the index or keeping a fixed 
style. 
Basiewicz and Auret (2009) examined the cross section of average returns on the JSE 
for all companies listed on the JSE from December 1989 to July 2005. They found the 
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presence of value and size premia on the JSE before and after adjusting for liquidity, 
however the size premium was more persistent. They also found that price to book 
has the stronger explanatory peer to predict returns and price to earnings was 
weakest.  
On the other hand, Auret and Cline (2011) updated a study done by Robins et al. 
(1999), where they tested for the existence of value (low price to book), size premiums 
and the January anomaly effect on the JSE. They separated the data into two periods 
similarly to the original study. They found no significant evidence of size premium 
(market equity), value (low price to book) or “January effects” in both periods, which is 
consistent with the original study. 
2.9 Hypothesis II and III (Relative riskiness of Value and growth strategy) 
Fama and French (1992) argued that value outperformed growth stocks because 
value stocks are fundamentally riskier. Patkova and Zhang (2005) studied relative 
risks of both value and growth for the period 1927 to 2001, using ex ante risks 
parameter measures, namely, credit default spreads and short term interest rate. The 
outcome was that value stocks are riskier; which is consistent with Fama and French 
(1992). 
Lakonishok (1994) argued against two theories that explained why value strategies 
have outperformed growth strategies. Firstly, value strategy outperforms because they 
exploit the mistakes of naïve investors, which entails that some investors behaviourally 
read too much into what has transpired in the past, which often is not warranted or 
justified; hence growth strategy underperforms value style.  
Secondly, value strategies outperform because they are fundamentally riskier. He 
argues that if value counters or strategy has a fundamentally higher risk than growth 
strategy, than value strategy needs to struggle against growth strategy in two bad 
states of the world. Moreover, those states of the world on average should be “bad 
states”, making the value strategy less attractive to investors with low risk tolerance. 
To test for such, he looked at consistency of performance of value and growth strategy 
over time with the aim of establishing if value underperforms in recessions and during 
times of severe market decline. The results were that value strategy did about the 
same and sometimes better during recessions; in addition, value strategy 
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outperformed growth strategy during times of severe market declines; contradicting the 
assertion that value stocks are riskier. 
 
2.10 Conclusion 
The review of literature clearly indicates the persistence of value premium globally; 
particularly in emerging markets over the long term. Albeit growth stocks also 
outperform in certain periods, such as, post 2007 in the US.  
The reasons on why the premium exists are still debatable, with Patkova and Zhang 
(2005), supporting Fama and French (1992), and arguing that value strategy’s superior 
performance exists because of higher risk. However, Lakonishok et al. (1994), argue, 
from the behavioural finance point of view, that value stocks benefit  from naïve 
investors, who follow the herd and extrapolate earnings too far into the future and fail 
to take advantage of out of favour stocks. 
The return - risk relationship by CAPM was also challenged globally, with beta proven 
to be insufficient explanatory power in the US by Fama and French (1992). The same 
was done in emerging markets such as China, where Ning and Liu (2004) found 
CAPM failed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and, importantly, Van Rensburg 
(2001) also found that value, size and momentum explains expected returns in South 
Africa, which contradict CAPM. 
The efficient market hypothesis is also challenged by the empirical results favouring 
value stocks over growth stocks, with behavioural finance weighing in against the 
theory on the back of the fact that people are irrational and process information 
differently, which causes the market to be temporally or persistently inefficient. The 
size effect, which is present globally, also challenges the efficient market hypothesis 
theory. 
However, Frederick (2015) suggests that recently value stocks have come under 
immense pressure locally and globally on the back of low interest rates following the 
global financial crisis, and Blount (2014) notes that style investing in South Africa is 
often dismissed due to the small market. As such, it is of utmost importance to 
investigate the value versus growth phenomenon on the FTSE/JSE. 
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of the study was to determine if mean excess returns of the value 
strategy outperform the mean excess returns of growth strategy for the period 31 
December 2000 to 31 December 2014. We applied a revised Lakonishok et al. (1994) 
methodology, using one variable method, namely, the price to book to define value 
and growth stocks.  
We split the primary and secondary objectives into three hypotheses. The general 
belief is that value stocks outperform growth stocks internationally, so the first 
objective was to prove if this is true in South Africa for the period of analysis.  
3.2 Research Method 
The design was quantitative in nature because the study analysed the comparative 
performance and attributes of four portfolios, using the revised one variable 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) methodology. The data used to create and analyse portfolios 
was obtained from Bloomberg. 
To duplicate Lakonishok et al. (1994) in South Africa, we needed to acknowledge that 
there are major differences between a developed market, such as the United States of 
America and an emerging market, such as South Africa. Lakonishok et al. (1994)’s 
methodology only included the largest 50% of firms by market capitalisation.  
On the other hand, South Africa has a lower number of stocks compared to the United 
States of America, hence we focused on all stocks listed on the FTSE/JSE main 
board, which largely represents the institutional investor’s universe and represents 
about 99% of all companies by market cap. This also ensures we have enough sample 
size required to conduct this research. Portfolio construction is rules based per Board 
Notice 90 of 2014 2  relating to Collective Investment Scheme Control Act, 2002 
(CISCA) which governs how institutional managers manage money. 
                                               
2
 The Financial Service Board (FSB) regulates the asset management industry and thereby issues limits and 
types of securities that may be included in a portfolio via the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act, 
2002 (CISCA) using Board Notice 90 of 2014. 
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For the purpose of the study, we evaluated the comparative performance of two 
investment styles that have been selected, based on one year buy and hold view.  
Portfolio analysis was used to determine which style outperforms over time using one 
variable classification, specifically price to book ratio. This classification process 
created four portfolios, namely deep value (lowest 25% or quartile 1 on price to book 
ratio), relative value (quartile 2 on price to book ratio), relative growth (quartile 3 on 
price to book) or super growth (highest 25% or quartile 4 on price to book). 
Upon portfolio creation, the performance of each portfolio was tracked and rebalanced 
over a one year period. This created a monthly series of returns for all portfolios 
rebalanced annually in December each year. The investment horizon is different to 
Lakonishok et al. (1994)’s of a five years buy and hold strategy, as we believe that in 
South Africa, there are very few institutional investors that rebalance their portfolio 
once in every five years.  
This method is not without its disadvantages, which are including but not limited to 
higher trading cost. However the reality is that active managers do change their 
portfolios in order to reflect their current best view, hence stocks that have moved 
outside their investment style due to price movements and other stock specific issues 
tend to be traded.  
This also gives new entrants the opportunity to be considered and thus also exclude 
suspended stocks or address stocks with corporate action in a correct manner. This 
method was also an effort to keep the definition or classification of style consistent 
every year, with portfolio turnover being monitored closely. Portfolio analysis was used 
to determine which styles reigns supreme over the period of study.  
The study period for this analysis was from December 2000 to December 2015, with a 
one year buy and hold strategy, generating monthly returns based on the above 
methodology. 
3.2.1 Returns process 
The monthly returns for all companies were calculated using the formula: 
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Equation 3-1: Monthly returns formula 
    
   –    
    
  
Where: 
  = return on share in month m 
    = share price at end of month m 
    = share price at end of month m – 1 
Excess return for each portfolio or company was calculated using the below formula; 
Equation 3-2: Monthly Excess returns formula 
            
Where: 
      = Excess return for portfolio 
    = Return on the portfolio 
   = three months Jibar (Risk free rate) 
3.2.2 Sharpe ratio Formula 
The Sharpe ratio measures the reward obtained per unit of total risk assumed in the 
portfolio.  
Equation 3-3: Sharpe Ratio 
             
      
  
  
Where: 
      Expected return of the portfolio 
      Three months jibar rate (Risk free rate) 
     Standard deviation of portfolio returns  
40 
 
3.2.3 Calculating the value Premium 
Differences in four portfolios were determined in order to isolate the deep value 
premium and relative value premium. Deep value premium was calculated as the 
difference between deep value portfolio returns and super growth portfolio returns, 
denoted as (RDVSG). Assuming statistical significance, a positive (RDVSG) indicates that 
deep value shares on average outperform super growth shares. The second premium 
is relative value premium, calculated as the difference between relative value portfolio 
return minus relative growth portfolio returns, denoted as (RRVRG). A positive RRVRG 
means that on average, relative value shares outperform relative growth shares, 
assuming statistical significance. 
Pairwise correlation was calculated between deep value premium and relative value 
premium, to ascertain if value premium from deep value has a strong relationship with 
relative value. 
3.2.4 Statistical inference  
Inference statistics help in drawing conclusion on a population based on a sample of 
data at hand. It is important to distinguish between analytical findings that indicate a 
relationship to those that are statistically significant. This study uses student t statistic 
and p values, which helps establish meaningful statistical relationships between 
variables being tested.  
According to Brooks (2014), the p value represents the exact or measure of 
significance level. He further stated that, informally, the p value has the probability of 
being wrong when the null hypothesis is rejected. For example a p<0.05 indicates 
there is a statistical relationship, at 5% significant level, hence rejecting the null 
hypothesis.   
3.2.5 Abnormal risk adjusted returns 
To test whether each portfolio produces abnormal risk adjusted return, we used 
classical regression model, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators to test if each 
portfolio performance yields abnormal returns relative to the benchmark. This was 
done for each portfolio independently. 
Equation 3-4: Ordinary least square equation (OLS) 
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                Where         
   
  - Excess return of portfolio above risk free rate 
  - Abnormal return (Alpha) 
  - Market beta 
   - Market risk premium 
  - Error term 
The CAPM intercept, also known as Jensen’s alpha, representing the abnormal return, 
was coined by Jensen (1968), and is commonly used to measure portfolio 
performance. A biased alpha can lead to an erroneous and misleading conclusion 
about portfolios performance. 
The function above is a univariate regression model where excess return of each of 
the four portfolios was regressed against market excess returns. The independent 
variable is the market excess return and dependent variable is each of the portfolios. 
The coefficient of determination, represented by R2 represents the extent the 
independent variable (Market excess return) can explain the variation in dependent 
variable (Portfolio excess return). In this context, it represents the extent to which 
portfolio mean excess return variation can be explained by market mean excess 
returns. 
Bhatnagar et al. (2010) used a similar method where he tested CAPM versus a three 
factor model in the UK for the period from April 2000 to June 2007.They established 
that value stocks outperform growth stocks. Additionally, they found a very low R2, 
which indicate that value stocks returns are not fully captured by the CAPM model. 
The significance of the market beta and alpha will be tested using a Student two tail t- 
test. This tests if the slope (market beta) and intercept (alpha) is significantly different 
from zero. We used the p-value to test if these two on each portfolio are statistically 
significant. 
For Ordinary least squares (OLS), there are five desirable properties that must be met 
in order to validly conduct the hypothesis tests. 
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1. The average value of the error term is zero, which, according to Brooks (2014), 
will never be violated if the regression has a constant term. 
2. Homoscedasticity is assumed, which entails that variance of the error term 
should be constant 
3. The covariance of error term over time should be zero. The errors are assumed 
to be uncorrelated 
4. The explanatory variables or the independent variable must be non-stochastic. 
5. The error term should be normally distributed. 
According to Brooks (2014), homoscedasticity, where the error term is constant, can 
be tested using White’s test. If errors are not constant over time, they are said to be 
heteroskedastic. OLS, in the presence of non-constant variance, still gives unbiased 
and consistent coefficient estimates; however, they no longer have the minimum 
variance, which could lead to incorrect inferences.  
Similarly, when error terms are correlated with each other over time, which can be 
tested using Breusch-Godfrey test, the estimates are still unbiased and consistent, but 
the standard errors could be wrong, leading to the possibility of making incorrect 
inferences. Using robust standard errors corrects for both errors and leads to better 
standard errors (Brooks, 2014). 
We used the three - months Johannesburg Interbank Agreed Rate (Jibar) as a risk 
free rate, as this is the reference rate mostly used in the futures market for cost of 
carry. 
3.3 Secondary Research  
Upon creation of the portfolios using the one variable method by Lakonishok et al. 
(1994), we determined the performance of each portfolio using portfolio analysis 
during periods of different states of the world.  
To measure the states of the economy, we used the monthly market returns, i.e., 
FTSE/JSE returns from January 2001 to December 2015, sorting it into three periods 
namely, the best forty five monthly returns, the worst forty five monthly return and the 
intermediate 90 months. The average returns on those periods were calculated to 
measure the relative riskiness of each investment style. Lakonishok et al. (1994) 
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argued that for value counters to be riskier than growth counters, the former will 
underperform during the worst forty five monthly returns. 
The second indicator to the states of the economy was the quarterly GDP, which was 
measured by quarterly growth rate. There are 59 quarters during the period January 
2001 to December 2015.The Q42015 was released in March 2015. The 59 quarters 
were sorted by the best fourteen quarters, the worth fifteen and the intermediate thirty 
quarters. The average returns for each portfolio was calculated and contrasted to 
measure the relative riskiness of each style. 
3.4 Population, Sample and Unit of Analysis 
3.4.1 Population 
The universe of the study was all counters listed on FTSE/JSE Index main board. This 
represents about 99% percent of the full market capitalization of the index, which 
represents institutional portfolio manager’s investable universe. According to 
Bloomberg, there were 160 ordinary stocks listed on FTSE/JSE main board, with a 
total market capitalisation of ZAR 9 742 9179 million, as at December 2014. 
3.4.2 Sample 
The samples portfolio consists of stocks that are listed on the FTSE/JSE All Share 
Index from December 2000 through to December 2015. The FTSE/JSE Africa Index 
Series is well established in the local market, has been in existence since 2002 from 
the joint venture between the JSE Limited (JSE) and the FTSE group (FTSE).The 
FTSE/JSE Africa Index series replaced the JSE Actuaries Index. 
The FTSE/JSE index series is based on free float adjustment methodology, whereas 
the JSE Actuaries Index was based on full market capitalisation of companies. The All 
Share benchmark methodology is based on the premise that it represents a broad 
market benchmark, reviewed annually in December and includes 99% of all eligible 
companies base of “gross market cap”, measured by product of the number of 
outstanding shares and share price. However, before the companies that make up the 
index are selected, two eligibility screening criteria are employed FTSE/JSE (2015): 
 The minimum liquidity screen  
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 The minimum free float screen 
Minimum liquidity screen ensures that a company must trade at least 0.5% of its 
issued capital per month, for a minimum of 8/12 months, for it to remain in the index. 
This however does not mean the index is fully tradable in all scenarios; it is mainly 
used to exclude illiquid securities in order to ensure that a reliable price exists for all 
qualifying companies.  
The minimum free float rule requires that companies maintain a free float3 of more 
than 5%. Any company with a free float of less than 5% is not eligible for inclusion. 
Additionally any company with free float of between 5% and 15% is not eligible for 
inclusion, unless the companies’ investable market cap is greater than the average 
companies market cap in the All Share. The All Share index is subject to a minimum of 
160 companies FTSE/JSE (2015). 
Bloomberg has an agreement with the JSE to be a secondary data source provider, for 
data starting from 1995. However the quality of the data improves from year 2000.The 
JSE back tested the data using the FTSE methodology (Free float) from year 1995 to 
year 2000, and Bloomberg data quality starts improving from year 2000, hence our 
start date for this research. 
3.4.3 Unit of Analysis  
The unit of analysis was based on four portfolios that were created and rebalanced 
each year, namely Deep value; Relative value, Relative growth and Super growth 
drawn from Lakonishok et al. (1994)’s one variable method based on one year buy 
and hold strategy. The returns on each portfolio were then calculated to create a 
monthly time series data for the period of the study. This performance was then used 
to compare the performance of the four portfolios. Additionally, portfolio analysis was 
used to determine which portfolio performed better than the market, in an event where 
the overall market is negative or positive. As such, we also determined which portfolio 
outperformed during different economic regimes in South Africa. 
                                               
3
Issued shares that are available for trading after removing restricted investors such as directors, employee 
schemes, treasury shares, government holdings and cross holdings, among others. 
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3.5  Data Collection  
Financial ratio information was obtained from the Bloomberg database of standardised 
financial accounts from December 2000 through to December 2015. For the period 
2000 to 2002, the JSE provided back tested numbers of the FTSE/All share index 
using the free float adjustments and included dividends for the period, Bloomberg has 
this data in their database and the quality of fundamental data starts to improve from 
year 2000 as opposed to the 1995 start date.  
For the period 2002 to 2015, the FTSE/All share index was fully functionally with 
Bloomberg getting real time updates on all the company prices and fundamental data. 
Book value per share is also known as common equity, defined as total assets minus 
total liabilities. The sample contains all stocks from the FTSE/ JSE main board.  
The return data was also obtained from Bloomberg, adjusted from dividends and 
corporate events. The data shows missing values on delisted companies, which assist 
with survivorship bias. It is important to use Bloomberg PORT (portfolio and risk 
analytics) function to maintain, monitor and generate monthly total stock returns and 
monitor corporate actions. 
3.6 Portfolio Analysis 
The performance of the portfolios were tracked using Excel but the total returns of 
each stock was obtained from Bloomberg. 
3.6.1 Portfolio creation 
There are a number of methods that could be used to classify stocks according to 
style. Lakonishok et al. (1994) used both one variable and two variable methods to 
define growth or value stocks.  
South Africa is an emerging market with some 160 companies in the All share 
compared to the 6000 stocks that Lakonishok et al. (1994) used for their analysis for 
the United States of America. That said, we opted to use the one variable method, 
particularly the price to book, which according to Auret and Sinclaire (2006), has 
superior explanatory power than price to earnings or size in South Africa. 
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Capual et al. (1993) also used price to book to categorise stocks into value or growth 
in six major markets, which was also used to test if the outcome in South Africa is 
consistent with international evidence. 
For the purpose of this study, any company with negative book value was excluded as 
our definitions of each quartile remains true if the numbers are positive. 
3.6.2 Portfolio Construction 
We used the guidance from Board Notice 90 of 2014 relating to the Collective 
Investment Scheme Control Act, 2002.This assisted in determining security eligibility in 
the portfolio. 
The following limits applied on portfolio construction. 
 Equity securities issued by any one concern- 
(i) Maximum 5% in a portfolio in a security with a market 
capitalisation of less than R2 billion,  
(ii) Maximum 10% in a portfolio in a security with a market cap of 
greater than R2billion,or maximum of 120% of the security 
weighting in the index, or  
(iii) Maximum 20% in a portfolio where the index represents the broad 
or overall index, or 
(iv) Maximum 35% in a portfolio where the index represents sub-set of 
the overall index.  
3.6.3 Portfolio Maintenance 
The portfolio construction was based on market cap weighted using the Board Notice 
90 of 2014 relating to collective investment scheme control act, 2002, with twelve 
months buy and hold strategy, rebalanced annually to remain consistent or true to the 
style return. We used a total return approach, with dividend on the day of receipt, 
assuming no transaction costs and tax implications. The portfolio remained fully 
invested in equities with all the cash received from delisted or acquired shares or 
proportionally invested in the portfolio on date of receipt. 
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3.7 Data Management  
The main data was obtained from the Bloomberg database, which takes into the 
account corporate actions such as delisting, mergers and acquisitions, initial public 
offering. 
3.7.1 Survivorship bias 
The issue of survivorship bias has been addressed by the following rules; 
 Delisted company— the cash received was calculated using the closing price of 
last date the share was public and proceeds were invested in the remaining 
shares proportionally in the portfolio. 
 Acquired company—the price accepted by majority of shareholders was used 
and proceeds were invested in the remaining shares proportionally in the 
portfolio 
 Liquidated, suspended or bankrupt company-- we assumed zero valuation until 
rebalance date in December. 
 Dividends (declared or special)—the  proceeds were invested in the remaining 
shares proportionally in the portfolio 
 Unbundled business unit –if the company was listed, then we added the new 
company into the portfolio however if there was a cash option, the proceeds were 
invested in the remaining shares proportionally in the portfolio. 
3.8 Data validity and reliability  
The main source of data is Bloomberg. They attempt to cover all available data issued 
in financial statements from January 2000 as a base, but for companies listed before 
that, they cover as much history as they could find available. They have fundamental 
data history for the major listed equities since IPO and complete coverage of JSE 
listed equities from January 2012. 
For corporate actions, they monitor a variety of sources, including but not limited to 
JSE Stock Exchange News Service (SENS) releases, company websites and broker 
updates. All financial data is reported in Rand terms as per the standardised financial 
statements in Bloomberg. 
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3.9 Limitation of the study  
The primary research is based on historical data from the period of December 2000 
through to December 2015; the results of the study were accurate for the period under 
review. It is important to understand that past performances are not guaranteed into 
the future in the investment field due to the dynamic nature of the industry. 
The markets are not always driven by fundamentals, other factors such as momentum 
and sentiment are also important drivers of market performance. The portfolios were 
created using fundamentals and could perform differently during extreme marker 
conditions, such as bull markets or during a bear period that are not driven by 
fundamentals. 
Most institutional portfolio managers exclude stocks that are not listed on the main 
board i.e. on AltX due to liquidity constraints, which means we needed to exclude the 
stocks in question. 
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4 Findings 
 
The aim of this study was to determine if mean excess return of value style is superior 
to mean excess returns of growth style. Additionally, to test the relative risk of value 
versus growth in two states of the world, namely, economic contraction and financial 
crisis during the period of the study. 
This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 4.1 presents the summary of the 
data. The second part presents the CAPM results on which portfolios generate 
abnormal risk adjusted returns. The third part covers the mean excess return of value 
versus growth and the fourth part covers performance of value and growth in different 
financial markets and economic conditions and the final section is the conclusion. 
4.1 Summary of the data 
We used Lakonishok et al. (1994)’s one variable method, namely, price to book  to 
categorise stocks into different styles, namely deep value, relative value, relative 
growth and super growth. 
Table 4-1: The number of stocks in each portfolio 
 
Four portfolios were constructed annually based on price to book ratios, over the period of the study. Deep 
value(DV) represents  the lowest 25% or quartile 1 on price to book ratio, relative value (quartile 2 on price 
to book ratio), relative growth (quartile 3 on price to book) or super growth (highest 25% or quartile 4 on 
price to book).Table 4-1 presents the results on  number of stocks in each portfolio for the respective year. 
Table 4-1 sets out the number of stocks in each portfolio over the period of the 
study.The deep value portfolio represents quartile 1 (the lowest 25%) of stocks ranked 
by price to book on the FTSE/JSE, relative value represent quartile 2 (the next 25% 
after quartile 1) of stocks, relative growth represent quartile 3 (the next 25% after 
Portfolio 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
DV 38 38 36 34 37 39 36 40 40 40 40 38 41 40 40
RV 38 37 36 34 37 39 36 39 38 38 40 39 40 40 40
RG 39 38 36 34 37 39 36 40 39 40 40 39 40 40 40
SG 39 37 36 34 37 39 36 40 40 40 40 39 41 40 40
Total 154 150 144 136 148 156 144 159 157 158 160 155 162 160 160
DV Deep Value
RV Relative Value
RG Relative growth
SG Super growth
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quartile 2) and quartile 4 represents the highest 25% of stocks ranked according to the 
price to book.  
The year on year each refers to twelve months ending December 31 each year. The 
lowest total number of stocks occurred in 2003 due to a lot of corporate actions in 2002, 
to mention a few, Nedbank acquired BOE and Nedcor investment bank, with Investment 
Solutions Holdings and Siltek LTD also delisting in 2002. 
 
Figure 4-1 present the maximum price to book ratio for each portfolio, with deep value (DV), relative value 
(RV) and Relative growth (RG) reading from left axis and Super growth (SG), reading from the right axis. 
The JSE representing the market was also tracked over the period (reading from left axis) 
Figure 4-1: The price to book ratios of the portfolio over time 
 
Figure 4-1 shows the price to book of the portfolios and the market. For DV (deep value) 
portfolio, price to book in 2014 for all the stocks was less than 1.26, with RV (relative 
value) portfolio price to book for all stocks in between 1.26 and 1.85, with RG relative 
growth price to book above 1.85 but less than 3.37, with SG (super growth) portfolio, 
represented by line graph (RHS axis), price to book above 3.37 but less than 8.97. 
The price to book average on the JSE in 2014 was 2.14, which is slightly more than 
relative value portfolio price to book of 1.85 but lower than relative growth, which is 
expected, since relative growth stocks are priced higher than average stocks in the 
market. There is a significant decrease in price to book from 2007 to 2008, which 
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corresponds with the global financial crisis, however the price to book ratio has 
increased from 2009, symbolising a recovery in the financial market 
Figure 4-2: The JSE Market cap and Volume traded from 2001 
 
At the end of each month from December 2000 to December 2015, we tracked the volumes of 
shares traded in the JSE, represented by bar graphs. We also tracked the growth of the JSE 
market cap over the same period. Data source is Bloomberg. Figure 4-2 present the results. 
Figure 4-2 shows that the volumes traded on the JSE has increased significantly from 
year 2000, peaked at 6.7 billion shares in 2008, however averaged less than 5 billion 
shared from 2008 to 2015.The market cap of the JSE has increased from R1 trillion in 
2001 to above R10 trillion in 2015, which indicate that the market has grown massive 
over the period of study. 
Table 4-2: The sector returns of JSE from 2001 
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At the end of each month from December 2000 to December 2015, we calculated calendar year performance 
(Total returns) of all the sectors in the JSE using the International Classification Benchmark (ICB) 
classification methodology. The returns were sourced from Bloomberg. Table 4-2 present the results. 
Table 4-2 shows the sector breakdown of returns for all FTSE/JSE stocks listed on the 
main board using the International Classification Benchmark (ICB) methodology which 
is maintained by FTSE. The red color represents negative returns, which is much more 
evident in 2008, where all the sectors returned negative returns, partly due to the 
global financial crisis.  
Post the global financial crisis, sectors such as consumer goods, consumer services, 
financials and technology have recovered strongly and have not registered any 
negative calendar year returns. Basic materials have struggled over the last three 
years, with the return of -21% in 2015 on the back of continued lower commodity 
prices. Telecommunication was the worst performing in 2015, largely driven by MTN 
on the back of the Nigerian Communication Commission setting a $5.2 billion fine 
against MTN in November. 
4.1.1 Portfolios by Sector 
A sector breakdown by style using the one variable Lakonishok et al. (1994) 
methodology was classified using International Classification Benchmark (ICB) 4 
methodology which is maintained by FTSE. The sector breakdown indicates the 
percentage of stocks in each sector that met the respective portfolios criteria.  
Table 4-3: Deep value portfolio sector exposure 
 
Table 4-3 present the results of deep value portfolio sector exposure using International Classification 
Benchmark (ICB) classification methodology. The sector classification was sourced from Bloomberg.  
                                               
4
 International Classification Benchmark (ICB) is an industry classification methodology that categorises 
markets into sectors worldwide. 
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Table 4-3 shows the percentage of stocks that met the criteria of lowest 25% of stocks 
sorted by price to book relative to other stocks in the market. Over the period of study, 
the deep value fund has a bias against consumer goods, consumer services and 
technology. The portfolio, on the other hand, has had reasonable exposure to basic 
materials, financials and industrials.  
The lowest basic material exposure was lowest in 2002, which is expected as basic 
materials returned 93% in 2001, which means most stocks migrated away from being 
deep value to more growth category. The highest exposure to basic materials was in 
2015, which is expected as basic material stocks have struggled over the past three 
years, hence the higher exposure. 
Table 4-4: Relative value portfolio sector exposure 
 
Table 4-4 present the results of Relative value portfolio sector exposure using International Classification 
Benchmark (ICB) classification methodology. The sector classification was sourced from Bloomberg. 
Table 4-4 shows relative value portfolio exposure, which represents stocks that met 
the criteria of the second highest 25% of stocks sorted by low price to book relative to 
other stocks in the market. The relative value portfolio has a bias against Consumer 
service, Technology stocks, Healthcare, and Telecommunication stocks.  
It has reasonable exposure to consumer goods, which makes it different to the deep 
value portfolio. The highest basic material exposure in the relative portfolio was in 
2009 at 45% from 4% in 2008, which it picked up after basic material stocks fell by 
31% in 2008. The relative value fund has a bias towards the financial sector over the 
period of study. 
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Table 4-5: Relative growth portfolio sector exposure 
 Table 4-5 present the results of Relative Growth portfolio sector exposure using International 
Classification Benchmark (ICB) classification methodology. The sector classification was sourced from 
Bloomberg. 
Table 4-5 shows the relative growth portfolio, which represents stocks that met the 
criteria of the third highest 25% of stocks sorted by low price to book relative to other 
stocks in the market. The highest basic material exposure came in 2008, which was a 
year after the sector returned 28% the previous year, which is expected given our 
methodology.  
The portfolio occasionally has high exposure to Telecommunications in year 2005 and 
2015. The portfolio has low exposure to technology and healthcare over the period of 
the study. The relative growth fund has a bias towards the financial sector over the 
period of study, similarly to the relative value fund. 
Table 4-6: Super growth portfolio sector exposure 
 
Table 4-6 present the results of Super Growth portfolio sector exposure using International Classification 
Benchmark (ICB) classification methodology. The sector classification was sourced from Bloomberg. 
Table 4-6 shows the super growth portfolio, which represents stocks that met the 
criteria of the highest 25% of stocks sorted by low price to book relative to other stocks 
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in the market. They have bias towards consumer service and consumer goods, 
additionally their lowest basic material exposure in 2015 of zero coincided with the 
highest exposure the deep value fund has on basic material. This fund is different to 
the deep value fund, and also has reasonable exposure to healthcare and 
telecommunications over the period of study.  
4.1.2 Returns calculation results  
Table 4-7: Results of return calculation 
 
Table 4.8 presents the result for the portfolio returns using both market capitalization and equal weighted 
methodology. 
Table 4-7 shows the returns calculation using both the market cap weighted (guidance 
from Board 90 CISCA regulation5) and portfolios constructed on an equal weighted 
basis. The results on market cap weighted basis shows that relative growth 
                                               
5
 The Financial Service Board (FSB) regulates the asset management industry and thereby issues limits 
and types of securities that may be included in a portfolio via the Collective Investment Schemes 
Control Act, 2002 (CISCA) using Board Notice 90 of 2014. 
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outperforms all the other portfolios, returning 18.87% per annum (since inception) with 
deep value coming a close second, returning 18.13% per annum. Super growth 
portfolio was the worst performer returning 15.78% per annum, which is 3.09% below 
relative growth portfolio. However, over the past five years, relative growth and super 
growth portfolios have outperformed deep value and relative value portfolio by an 
average of more than 10% per annum, which supports Friedrich (2015) that value as a 
style has come under immense pressure recently. 
Relative growth also had the worst month of -16.4%, with deep value -10.47% being 
the best worst month out of the four portflios, as expected; the best month came from 
super growth portfolios, returning 15.86%. On absolute risk basis, deep value has the 
worse volatility measured by a standard deviation of 18.2%, with the lowest volatility 
coming from relative value portfolio, with standard deviation of 15.1%. Deep value and 
relative growth were both positive 65.6% of the time, with relative value being the 
portfolio with the lowest monthly positive number at 61.1%. 
On an equally weighted basis, the best performing porfolio was deep value, returning 
26.66% since inception, relative value portfolio was a distant second with a return of 
19.69%. The worst performer was the super growth portfolio, with a return of 17.08%, 
which is 9.58% below deep value. This symbolises that large cap value stocks have 
underperformed mid/small cap value stocks, which conforms with size premium.Over 
the past five years, relative growth and super growth has outperformed both deep 
value and relative value, which is consistant with the results above, however the 
magnitude is lower. 
Relative value has the lowest worst month return of -15.12%, with deep value 
producing the best worst monthly return of -10.48%. On the other hand, deep value 
produced the highest monthly return of 26.51%, with Super growth generating the 
worst best month of 10.88%. 
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Figure 4-3: The cumulative value versus growth in South Africa 
 
Four portfolios were constructed annually based on price to book ratios, over the period of the study. Deep 
value(DV) represents  the lowest 25% or quartile 1 on price to book ratio, relative value (quartile 2 on price 
to book ratio), relative growth (quartile 3 on price to book) or super growth (highest 25% or quartile 4 on 
price to book). 
 
Figure 4-3 shows the cumulative returns on R100 invested since inception for the four 
portfolios constructed on market cap weighted basis. The graph shows deep value 
outperformed the other portfolios from 2004 to 2008; however, relative growth was 
ahead briefly in February and March 2008, which was the period leading up to the 
global financial crisis.  
The relative growth porfolio lost ground in mid 2008 to early 2009 during the global 
financial crisis, which is expected and deep value and relative value outperformed until 
2012. The deep value portfolio has been undeperforming since 2013, with relative 
growth outperforming all the strategies to December 2015, which we last saw in a build 
up to the financial crisis in 2008. Super growth portfolio is the worst performing porfolio 
over the period of this study. 
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Figure 4-4: The cumulative value versus growth in South Africa (Equal 
Weighted) 
 
Figure 4-4 presents the cumulative returns for all portfolios for R100 invested since inception based on 
equally weighted portfolio construction methodology. 
Figure 4-4 shows the cumulative returns on R100 invested since inception for the four 
portfolios constructed on equal weighted basis. Deep value outperforms the other 
porfolio by a huge margin, however the outperformance has come down since 2014. 
Relative growth is outperforming relative value since 2012, which is testament that 
value has come under immense pressure in the past five years. Super growth portfolio 
is the worst performing portfolio since inception. 
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Table 4-8: Results of Value Premium 
 
Deep value premium is difference in returns between deep value and super growth, whereas relative value 
premium is difference in returns between relative value and relative growth portfolios. Table 4.8 presents 
the descriptive statistics of each premium. 
Table 4-8 sets out the results for the two premiums calculated, namely, the deep value 
premium, which represents the difference between deep value portfolio returns and 
super growth portfolio returns. Relative value premium is the difference in relative 
value portfolio returns and relative growth portfolio returns.  
The results on the market cap weighted basis shows that the Deep value premium is 
0.19% per month, which entails that value counters outperform growth counters over 
the period of the study; however, the results are not statistically significant, 
represented by p value of 0.65 (which is greater than 0.05). Relative value premium is 
-0.16% per month, which entail that relative growth outperforms relative value, 
however the results were still not statistically significant. 
On an equal weighted basis, deep value premium is 0.7% per month, which is 
statistically significant at 5% level, as evidence by p-value of 0.01 (less than p-value of 
0.05). However, the relative value premium is -0.05% per month, which is not 
statistically significant at 5% level. 
Deep Value 
Premium
Relative Value 
Premium
Mean 0.19% -0.16%
Median 0.40% -0.28%
Standard deviation 5.66% 3.18%
t statistics 0.45                     -0.65                    
P value 0.65                     0.51                     
Mean 0.70% -0.05%
Median 0.57% -0.36%
Standard deviation 3.29% 2.87%
t statistics 2.83                     -0.24                    
P value -                       0.81                     
Market Cap Weighted
Equally Weighted
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Table 4-9: Results of correlations 
 
Table 4.9 presents the correlation between deep value premium (i.e. correlation of deep value premium 
constructed using market cap methodology versus deep value premium based on equally weighted basis) 
and relative value premium premium (i.e. correlation of relative value premium constructed using market 
cap methodology versus relative value premium based on equally weighted basis)  
Table 4-9 shows the results of the two correlations. Firstly, the correlation between 
deep value premiums on portfolio constructed on a market cap weighted basis and 
deep value premium of equally weighted basis. The results show that the correlation 
between the two premiums is positive, 0.46 and statistically significant, p-value less 
than 0.05.  
This emphasises the important of portfolio construction as the equally weighted deep 
value premium is statistical significant whereas the market cap weighted premium is 
not statistically significant, yet the two are positively correlated and statistically 
significant. 
The same applies for the relative value premium, where the relationship between the 
two portfolio construction methodology is highly positively correlated, 0.73 and 
statistically significant, p-value less than 0.05. 
4.2 Abnormal risk adjusted returns 
Bhatnagar (2010) tested CAPM versus three factor model in the UK for the period April 
2000 to June 2007, where he found that value stocks outperform growth stocks. 
Additionally, he found a very low R2 which indicates that value stocks returns are not 
fully captured by the CAPM model.  
We only use the CAPM regression for our analysis on the back of the main aim 
interest being the significance of β0. According to Brooks (2014), the null hypothesis is: 
H0: β0 = 0. A positive and significant β0 for a given portfolio would suggest that the 
portfolio is able to generate significant abnormal returns above the market; similarly a 
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negative and significant β0 for a given portfolio would indicate that the portfolio is 
underperforming the market on a risk adjusted basis. 
Table 4-10: CAPM regression model output 
 
Table 4-10 presents the results for the regression model using CAPM equation, where Yi represents the 
excess returns of the portfolio, β0 represents the Jansen alpha or the intercept, βi represent market 
beta, X1t represents the marker excess returns and ϵi representing error term. The results are based on 
both market cap weighted and equal weighted portfolio construction methodology. ** represents 
significant at 5% level and *** represents significant at 1% level. 
Table 4-10 sets out the CAPM regression results for the four respective portfolios 
using both market capitalisation and equal weighted portfolio construction 
methodology. We used robust standard errors for all regressions in order to eliminate 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the model, thus enabling us to make better 
inferences. 
For deep value excess returns constructed using a market cap weighted basis against 
market excess return (equity risk premium), constant term (Jansen alpha) is not 
statistically significantly different from zero, as evidence by p value of 0.11. Thus the 
deep value portfolio means excess returns do not generate abnormal returns on a risk 
adjusted basis in a market cap weighted portfolio. The low R2 of 16% also suggests 
that the deep value returns are not captured by CAPM. Similarly, for relative value 
portfolios constructed on a market cap basis, alpha is not statistically significant from 
zero; implying that relative value does not generate abnormal returns. 
Likewise, relative growth portfolios constructed on a market cap basis, the constant 
term (Jensen alpha) is not statistically significant from zero. The same holds for super 
growth portfolios; they do not generate abnormal returns. 
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On the other hand, deep value portfolio excess returns constructed on an equal 
weighted basis constant term (Jensen alpha) is statistically significant from zero, as 
evidence by p value of 0.001, which is less than 0.05. This implies deep value 
abnormal returns of 0.96% per month as per the alpha coefficient on Table 4.10, for 
the period of the study. 
The same holds for Relative value and Relative growth portfolios excess returns 
constructed on an equal weighted basis with abnormal risk adjusted returns of 0.53% 
and 0.48% per month respectively, as per the alpha coefficient in table 4.10. 
However, for super growth portfolio excess returns constructed on an equally weighted 
basis, Jensen’s alpha is not statistically significant from zero, as evidence by p value 
of 0.210, which is above 0.05. This implies that the Super growth portfolio does not 
generate abnormal returns over the period of the study 
Table 4-11: CAPM regression model output (Controlling for Economic growth) 
α coefficient ρ-value βi coefficient ρ value D coefficient ρ value R-squared 
Deep Value 0.4% 0.44 0.43                      <0.01  *** 0.004 0.62              16.61%
Relative Value 0.5% 0.08    * 0.69                      <0.01  ***                      −0.006 0.16              60.23%
Relative Growth 0.2% 0.37 0.90                      <0.01  *** 0.001 0.64              84.08%
Super Growth 0% 0.84 0.87                      <0.01  *** 0.002 0.55              81.45%
Deep Value 0.9% <0.01  *** 0.67                      <0.01  *** 0.002 0.75              44.11%
Relative Value 0.8% 0.03    ** 0.57                      <0.01  ***                      −0.006 0.26              42.25%
Relative Growth 0.4% 0.13 0.70                      <0.01  *** 0.001 0.73              62.63%
Super Growth 0.0% 0.94 0.69                      <0.01  *** 0.005 0.23              63.59%
Market Cap weighted Portfolio
Equal weighted Portfolio
January 2001-December 2015
CAPM regression:  Yi =β0+βiX1t +DX2t+ϵi 
 
Table 4-11 presents the results for the regression model using CAPM equation, where Yi represents the 
excess returns of the portfolio, β0 represents the Jansen alpha or the intercept, βi represent market beta, 
X1t represents the marker excess returns, D coefficient represent a Dummy variable of 0 and 1, where 0 
represents a period where growth was less than 3% and 1 representing an environment where growth was 
higher than 3%, and ϵi representing error term. The results are based on both market cap weighted and 
equal weighted portfolio construction methodology. ** represents significant at 5% level and *** represents 
significant at 1% level. 
Table 4-11 sets out the CAPM regression results for the four respective portfolios 
using both market capitalisation and equal weighted portfolio construction 
methodology controlling for economic growth over the period of study. The average 
growth in quarterly GDP from 2001 to 2015 is approximately 3%. As such, we created 
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a dummy variable, where 0 represents an environment where growth is below 
average, 3%, and 1 representing an environment where growth is above average.  
The results for portfolios constructed on market cap weighted still shows no significant 
alpha for all portfolios except for relative value, which is significant at 10% significant 
level in an environment where growth is below average, as evidenced by non-
significant Dummy variable coefficient. 
The results are different for portfolios constructed on an equal weighted basis, where 
only relative value and deep value alpha is significant after controlling for economic 
conditions. Relative growth loses its significance when we control for economic 
conditions; suggesting that its outperformance may be conditional on a growing 
economy. In none of the regressions is the dummy variable significantly different from 
zero. 
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4.3 Mean excess returns of value versus growth 
Table 4-12: Average means excess returns on Market cap based methodology 
Year
Deep 
Value
Super 
Growth 
Return 
difference
Superior 
Portoflio t stats p-value Year
Relative 
Value
Relative 
Growth 
Return 
difference
Superior 
Portoflio t stats p-value
2001 1.72% -0.38% 2.10% DV 2.59    0.02      2001 1.53% 0.74% 0.79% RV 0.61   0.55             
2002 -0.69% -0.28% -0.41% SG -0.27   0.79      2002 -0.45% -0.58% 0.13% RV 0.15   0.88             
2003 2.09% 0.51% 1.58% DV 1.50    0.16      2003 1.57% 0.24% 1.32% RV 2.21   0.05             
2004 3.50% 0.42% 3.08% DV 1.77    0.10      2004 2.02% 2.12% -0.10% RG -0.17  0.87             
2005 3.58% 2.41% 1.17% DV 1.34    0.21      2005 2.37% 3.05% -0.68% RG -1.23  0.25             
2006 2.82% 2.35% 0.47% DV 1.31    0.22      2006 2.73% 2.10% 0.63% RV 1.43   0.18             
2007 -2.36% 0.73% -3.09% SG -1.25   0.24      2007 -0.19% 1.62% -1.81% RG -3.23  0.01             
2008 2.59% -2.48% 5.07% DV 1.55    0.15      2008 -2.38% -2.74% 0.37% RV 0.17   0.87             
2009 1.09% 1.99% -0.90% SG -0.69   0.50      2009 2.21% 2.08% 0.13% RV 0.15   0.88             
2010 0.19% 1.45% -1.26% SG -0.85   0.41      2010 1.67% 0.82% 0.85% RV 1.31   0.22             
2011 1.30% -0.10% 1.41% DV -1.47   0.25      2011 -0.73% 0.19% -0.92% RG -3.37  0.01             
2012 1.22% 1.74% -0.52% SG -1.07   0.31      2012 0.91% 2.11% -1.20% RG -2.22  0.05             
2013 1.19% 1.12% 0.07% DV 0.04    0.97      2013 0.21% 1.21% -1.00% RG -1.43  0.18             
2014 -2.43% 0.74% -3.17% SG -1.82   0.10      2014 -0.37% 0.74% -1.11% RG -1.76  0.11             
2015 -2.45% 0.27% -2.72% SG -2.50   0.03      2015 0.47% 0.21% 0.26% RV 0.23   0.83             
Year
Deep 
Value
Super 
Growth 
Superior on 
Risk 
Adjusted Year
Relative 
Value
Relative 
Growth 
Superior 
on Risk 
Adjusted
2001 0.24           -0.05      DV 2001 0.33       0.09        RV
2002 -0.12         -0.06      SG 2002 -0.09      -0.11       RV
2003 0.32           0.07       DV 2003 0.28       0.05        RV
2004 0.62           0.09       DV 2004 0.64       0.67        RG
2005 0.70           0.58       DV 2005 0.55       0.63        RG
2006 0.59           0.55       DV 2006 0.80       0.51        RV
2007 -0.39         0.18       SG 2007 -0.05      0.48        RG
2008 0.42           -0.32      DV 2008 -0.37      -0.32       RG
2009 0.27           0.43       SG 2009 0.37       0.38        RG
2010 0.07           0.31       SG 2010 0.43       0.18        RV
2011 0.52           -0.03      DV 2011 -0.33      0.07        RG
2012 0.50           1.41       SG 2012 0.35       0.95        RG
2013 0.45           0.38       DV 2013 0.07       0.34        RG
2014 -0.46         0.28       SG 2014 -0.14      0.27        RG
2015 -0.47         0.08       SG 2015 0.09       0.05        RV
Panel A:Mean Excess returns(Deep value versus Super Growth)
Panel B:Sharpe Ratio (Deep Value versus 
Super Growth)
Panel C:Mean Excess returns(Relative Value versus Relative 
Growth)
Panel D: Sharpe Ratio (Relative Value 
versus Relative Growth)
  
Table 4-12 presents the year by year average performance of mean excess returns of each portfolio, 
comparing deep value portfolio to super growth portfolio returns and relative value to relative growth on 
market capitalization basis. Student t- stats is used to test if the average mean returns are significantly 
different to zero, with p value representing the significance level.  
Table 4-12 (Panel A) shows that deep value outperformed super growth in the period 
2001 to 2008, with the exception of 2002 and 2007, whilst super growth showed 
superior perfomance from 2009 to 2015 with the exception of 2011 and 2013. The 
superior returns were statistically significant in two out of the fifteen  years. 
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These results do not show outright evidence of the value premium, which is 
contraditory to international evidence by Fama and French (1992) and Lakonishok 
(1994). However, Brandes (2012) concedes that the value premium has dropped from 
2007 to 2012, which bodes well with this research.  
Panel B of table 4.1 shows the results of the Sharpe ratio for both portfolios and it still 
supports the notion that there is no outright evidence of the value premium, with deep 
value more outperforming from 2001 to 2008, with the exception of 2002 and 2007, 
while supergrowth outperforming from 2009 with the exception of 2011 and 2013. 
Panel C show that relative value outperformed from 2001 to 2003, again in 2008 to 
2010, whereas relative growth outperfromed in 2004 to 2007, with the exception of 
2006, morever, relative growth outperformed from 2011 to 2014. The superior returns 
were statistically significant in three out of the fifteen  years, with two times favouring 
relative growth and one time favouring relative value. 
This indicates that there is no outright evidence of value style outperforming. 
Additionally, value has been under pressure during the past five years, which is in line 
with Friedrich (2015). Panel D, shows the Sharp ratio  and that relative value 
outperformed from 2001 to 2003 on a risk adjusted basis; however, relative growth 
outperformed from 2004 to 2015, with the exception of 2006, 2010 and 2015, which 
implies that relative growth has outperformed more times. 
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Table 4-13: Equally weighted portofolio 
Year Deep Value
Super 
Growth 
Return 
difference
Superior 
Portoflio t stat p-value Year
Relative 
Value
Relative 
Growth 
Return 
difference
Superior 
Portoflio t stats p-value
2001 1.74% -0.75% 2.49% DV 3.52        0.00        2001 1.25% -0.59% 1.84% RV 1.38   0.19         
2002 1.02% 0.48% 0.54% DV 0.57        0.58        2002 0.26% 0.53% -0.27% RG -0.48  0.64         
2003 2.74% 0.59% 2.15% DV 3.64        0.00        2003 2.34% 1.37% 0.97% RV 1.20   0.25         
2004 4.64% 1.47% 3.16% DV 1.36        0.10        2004 2.61% 2.84% -0.23% RG -0.50  0.63         
2005 3.99% 2.28% 1.71% DV 2.02        0.07        2005 2.44% 2.82% -0.38% RG -0.78  0.45         
2006 2.54% 2.09% 0.44% DV 1.29        0.22        2006 2.62% 2.39% 0.23% RV 0.53   0.61         
2007 0.68% 1.11% -0.43% SG -0.98       0.35        2007 0.20% 1.61% -1.40% RG -3.13  0.01         
2008 -1.99% -2.92% 0.93% DV 0.99        0.15        2008 -3.39% -2.73% -0.66% RG -0.56  0.59         
2009 2.65% 1.80% 0.85% DV 1.04        0.32        2009 2.40% 1.63% 0.77% RV 1.35   0.20         
2010 1.08% 1.83% -0.75% SG -1.23       0.25        2010 1.51% 1.05% 0.45% RV 1.03   0.33         
2011 1.42% 0.08% 1.33% DV 1.92        0.08        2011 -1.12% 0.04% -1.15% RG -5.98  0.00         
2012 1.54% 2.00% -0.46% SG -1.01       0.33        2012 1.54% 2.17% -0.63% RG -1.67  0.12         
2013 0.95% 0.97% -0.03% SG -0.04       0.97        2013 0.61% 1.00% -0.39% RG -0.81  0.43         
2014 1.04% 0.81% 0.23% DV 0.33        0.75        2014 -0.31% 0.72% -1.03% RG -1.83  0.09         
2015 -2.03% -0.30% -1.73% SG -2.00       0.07        2015 1.40% 0.31% 1.10% RV 0.56   0.59         
Year Deep Value
Super 
Growth 
Superior on 
Risk Adjusted Year
Relative 
Value
Relative 
Growth 
Superior on 
Risk Adjusted
2001 0.28               -0.10            DV 2001 0.28             -0.07           RV
2002 0.18               0.11             DV 2002 0.05             0.11            RG
2003 0.57               0.11             DV 2003 0.49             0.26            RV
2004 0.53               0.43             DV 2004 0.80             1.01            RG
2005 0.92               0.58             DV 2005 0.62             0.63            RG
2006 0.55               0.48             DV 2006 0.67             0.55            RV
2007 0.17               0.24             SG 2007 0.06             0.49            RG
2008 -0.33              -0.45            DV 2008 -0.56            -0.39           RG
2009 0.45               0.47             SG 2009 0.46             0.38            RV
2010 0.33               0.50             SG 2010 0.44             0.32            RV
2011 0.47               0.03             DV 2011 -0.57            0.02            RG
2012 0.75               1.21             SG 2012 0.75             1.00            RG
2013 0.32               0.45             SG 2013 0.23             0.42            RG
2014 0.46               0.30             DV 2014 -0.14            0.31            RG
2015 -0.41              -0.10            SG 2015 0.20             0.08            RV
Panel B:Sharpe Ratio (Deep Value versus Super 
Growth)
Panel D: Sharpe Ratio (Relative Value versus 
Relative Growth)
Panel A:Mean Excess returns(Deep value versus Super Growth) Panel C:Mean Excess returns(Relative Value versus Relative Growth)
 
Table 4.10 presents the year by year average performance of mean excess returns of each portfolio, 
comparing deep value portfolio to super growth portfolio returns and relative value to relative growth on 
equal weighted basis methodology. Student t- stats is used to test if the average mean returns are 
significantly different to zero, with p value representing the significance level. 
Table 4-13 (Panel A) shows that deep value outperformed super growth from 2001 to 
2006 and also in 2008 and 2009, with super growth outperforning from 2010 to 2015, 
with the exception of 2011 and 2014 period. The deep value superior returns were 
only statistically significant in two of the fifteen years. 
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This indicates that there is no outright evidence that deep value outperforms super 
growth over the period of the study even though this is stronger pre 2006. The results 
are the same on a risk adjusted basis, Panel B shows that Deep value outperforms 
from 2001 to 2006, however, post 2006 there is no clear pattern except for deep 
value coming under pressure from 2010. 
Panel C shows no significant pattern between relative value and relative growth from 
2001 to 2010, however post 2010, relative growth ouperformed relative value, with the 
exception of 2015. The relative growth superior returns were only statistically 
significant in two of the fifteen years. Panel D, which is the Sharp ratio, also confirms 
that there is no significant pattern, however post 2010, relative growth outperformed 
relative value, with the exception of 2015 on a risk adjusted basis. Additionally, relative 
value outperformed relative growth in nine out of the fifteen calender period mean 
excess returns. 
4.4 Perfomance of value versus growth strategies in different financial market 
and economic conditions 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) argued against the notion that value stocks outperform growth 
stocks because they are fundamentally riskier, by stating that if value shares are 
riskier than growth shares then they will underperform growth shares in periods of bad 
states of the economy and also during times of financial crisis. 
Table 4.12 shows the analysis of mean excess returns in bad and good states of the 
economy, there are 59 quarters of GDP from 2001, so the returns were grouped into 
three categories namely worst (15 quarters), intermediate (45 quarters) and best (15 
quarters).The results shows that the best perfoming portfolio in the worst economic 
conditions is relative value, followed by deep value porfolio, which supports the view of 
Lakonishok et al. (1994), that value syle is not risker.This also contradicts Maginn et 
al. (2007) that growth stocks outperform value stocks during an economic contraction 
period. 
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Table 4-14: Market cap weighted mean excess returns of four portfolios , 
Janaury 2001 to December 2015 
Measure
Deep 
value
Relative 
value
Relative 
growth
Super 
growth
Deep 
value 
premium
Relative 
Value 
premium
Returns in good and bad economic states
Mean Excess return-15 worst economic quarters 0.67% 2.10% -0.56% -1.12% 1.79% 2.66%
Mean Excess return-29 intermediate economic quarters 2.78% 1.64% 3.20% 2.41% 0.36% -1.56%
Mean Excess return-15 best economic quarters 5.89% 4.49% 6.00% 4.86% 1.03% -1.51%
Returns in good and bad markets
Mean Excess return-45 worst market conditions -1.53% -3.75% -4.97% -5.01% 3.48% 1.22%
Mean Excess return-90 intermediate market conditions 0.67% 0.82% 1.36% 0.99% -0.32% -0.54%
Mean Excess return-45 best market conditions 5.19% 5.95% 5.83% 6.94% -1.75% 0.13%  
Table 4-14 presents the performance of the portfolios in different economic and financial environment. 
Portfolios construction methodology was based on Market capitalization. 
Table 4-14 tracked the performance of the porfolios during different financial market 
conditions, there are 180 monthly returns from 2001 to 2015, so the returns were 
grouped into three main categories, namely, the worse (45 months) market conditions, 
intermediate  (90 months) conditions, and best (45 monthly) market conditions. The 
results clearly show that mean excess returns in deep value are the best during the 
worst market conditions, with relative growth and super growth mean excess returns 
outperforming during intermediate and best market conditions respectively. 
Table 4-14 shows similar result on an equally weighted basis, with the best performing 
porfolio during the worst economic condition being relative value and deep value, 
however deep value also outperforms during intermediate economic periods, with 
relative growth outperforming in best economic conditions. 
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Table 4-15: Equally weighted mean excess returns of four portfolios , Janaury 
2001 to December 2015 
Measure
Deep 
value
Relative 
value
Relative 
growth
Super 
growth
Deep 
value 
premium
Relative 
Value 
premium
Returns in good and bad economic states
Mean Excess return-15 worst economic quarters 1.87% 2.59% 0.58% -0.35% 2.22% 2.01%
Mean Excess return-29 intermediate economic quarters 5.85% 2.57% 2.88% 2.55% 3.30% -0.31%
Mean Excess return-15 best economic quarters 5.84% 4.55% 6.50% 5.23% 0.61% -1.95%
Returns in good and bad markets
Mean Excess return-45 worst market conditions -2.78% -3.06% -3.79% -4.01% 1.23% 0.73%
Mean Excess return-90 intermediate market conditions 1.38% 1.22% 1.45% 1.26% 0.11% -0.23%
Mean Excess return-45 best market conditions 4.46% 4.92% 4.56% 5.19% -0.74% 0.36%   
Four portfolios were constructed annually based on price to book ratios, over the period of the study. Deep 
value(DV) represents  the lowest 25% or quartile 1 on price to book ratio, relative value (quartile 2 on price 
to book ratio), relative growth (quartile 3 on price to book) or super growth (highest 25% or quartile 4 on 
price to book). Table 4-15 presents the performance of the portfolios in different economic and financial 
environment. Portfolios construction methodology was based on equal weighted basis. 
Table 4-15 shows the portfolio that outperformed during the worse financial market 
conditions remains deep value, with relative growth and super growth portfolios 
outperforming during intermediate and best market conditions respectively.This 
supports Lakonishok et al. (1994) that value stocks are not risker than growth styles. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we showed the results of which style reigns supreme between value 
and growth. The evidence shows that there is no outright significant dominant style in 
South Africa for the period 2001 to 2015, which is in line with Auret and Cline (2011). 
However, deep value premium constructed on equally weighted basis suggest that the 
value premium does exist.  
We also tested which portfolio generates abnormal risk adjusted returns above the 
market. The results shows that no portfolio constructed using market capitalisation 
based methodology generated significant abnormal risk adjusted returns above the 
market. However, the results are different on portfolios constructed on an equally 
weighted basis, with deep value, relative value and relative growth portfolios 
generating abnormal risk adjusted risk returns above the market, which implies that 
the large caps on the market cap methodology have underperformed small caps over 
the period of the study, which may talk to size premium. 
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Furthermore the results on which portfolio generates abnormal risk adjusted returns 
when controlling for economic growth suggest that on a market cap weighted portfolio, 
relative value portfolio alpha is significant, however on portfolios constructed using 
equally weighted methodology, both deep value and relative value generates 
abnormal returns. 
The results on mean excess returns of value stocks compared to growth stocks 
suggest that there is no outright evidence supporting a value premium, however on 
portfolios constructed on an equally weighted basis, deep value outperformed super 
growth from 2001 to 2006. However, value as a style has been out of favour since 
2010, with the trend favouring relative growth portfolios constructed on both methods. 
The results on value versus growth in different financial markets and economic 
conditions suggest that both deep value premium and relative value premium 
outperform during worse economic conditions over the period of study, with deep 
value portfolio outperforming all other portfolios in “bad markets” on portfolios 
constructed on both methods. Super growth portfolios, as expected, outperform other 
portfolios in “good market” on portfolios constructed on both methods. 
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5 Conclusion 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter two, this study introduced the arguments for value and growth stocks 
globally, including emerging markets and South Africa, with the arguments in favor of 
value stocks especially internationally, however there is contradicting evidence locally. 
We highlighted arguments on the efficient market hypothesis, which contradicts the 
existence of the two styles as the theory argues that it is not possible to outperform the 
market in the long term. CAPM, which argues that market beta is enough to explain 
the expected or average returns, is also in contradiction of the existence of these two 
styles, as Fama and French (1992) argued that there are other factors that explain the 
cross section of returns, such as size, leverage and value. Behavioural finance also 
argued against the efficient hypothesis, suggesting that factors like limit to arbitrage 
could lead to the market being inefficient for longer periods. Size premium was also 
discussed and evidence suggests that it exists both internationally and locally. 
Chapter three covered the hypothesis questions, which stated the research 
hypothesis, namely, does mean excess return of value stocks equal to mean excess 
returns of growth stocks. The second hypothesis related to the performance of value 
stocks during different economic conditions. The final hypothesis related to 
performance of value stocks duration different financial market conditions. The chapter 
also discussed the methodology used to answer the research questions. 
Chapter four discussed findings of the research based on the methodology and 
presented empirical results. This chapter concludes on the findings and recommends 
further research. 
5.2 Summary of findings 
The results show that there is limited evidence of the value premium in South Africa 
over the period 2001 to 2015, albeit there are some periods where one style is 
dominant over the other. However, deep value premium, which is difference in returns 
between deep value portfolio and super growth portfolio, suggests that the value 
premium exists in an equally weighted portfolio, implying that large caps have 
underperformed small caps over the period of study. 
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The regression results suggest that on portfolios constructed on a market cap 
weighted basis, none of the portfolios generates abnormal risk adjusted returns. 
However, relative value portfolio generates abnormal risk adjusted returns when we 
control for the economic growth. On portfolios constructed on an equal weighted basis, 
deep value, relative value and relative growth portfolios generated abnormal risk 
adjusted returns. However, only deep value and relative value generates abnormal 
returns when controlled for economic growth, suggesting that super growth 
outperformance may be conditional on a growing economy.  This further emphasises 
the importance of portfolio construction in asset management. 
The assessment of relative riskiness of value and growth portfolio as measured by 
returns of the portfolio in different financial and economic environments suggest that 
deep value portfolios protect during periods of financial crisis, with relative value 
portfolios outperforming during the worse economic period over the period of the 
study. 
In conclusion, there is no outright evidence of the value premium in South Africa over 
the period of analysis; however there are periods where value style is dominant over 
growth style, particularly between 2001 and 2006. Value as a style has been under 
pressure since 2010, with relative growth becoming more dominant over the period. 
Relative growth could be likened with growth at reasonable price (GARP), which, 
according to Maginn (2007), GARP investors seek for stocks with growth prospects 
that sell at moderate valuation, they do not want to overpay for earnings growth. 
5.3 Recommendation for further research 
This study showed that there is no dominant style in South Africa, which entails those 
capital allocators who believe in one style, should expect cyclical performance 
portfolios. That said, portfolios created on a market cap weighted basis do not generate 
abnormal risk adjusted returns over the period of analysis, whereas the outcome on 
portfolios constructed on an equal weighted basis suggest that some portfolios generate 
abnormal returns. This suggests that either small caps stocks have outperformed large 
caps over the period of the study, or position sizing of the large caps were not optimal. 
This warrants further research on size and optimal portfolio construction methodology, 
which will beneficial to capital allocators and portfolio managers. 
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Index of Acronyms and Abbreviations 
DV-Deep value 
E/P-Earnings to Price 
FTSE- Financial Times and London Stock Exchange 
GARP- Growth at reasonable price 
JSE-Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
MSCI- Morgan Stanley Capital International 
P/B-Price to Book 
P/S-Price to Sale 
RV-Relative Value 
RG-Relative growth 
SG-Super Growth 
JSE-Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
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